

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



## THESIS

**THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: EMERGING  
RELATIONSHIPS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR GREECE**

by

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June 2002

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**THE KOSOVO CONFLICT: EMERGING RELATIONSHIPS AND  
IMPLICATIONS FOR GREECE**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis examines the 1999 Kosovo conflict and subsequent NATO military intervention including implications for Greece. Additional areas of study include: a historical and social background of the Balkans; a revival of nationalist pursuits; and emerging regional stakeholder relationships.

The methodology included literature review, stakeholder analysis, and results of a researcher-developed questionnaire administered to 35 Greek officers. Survey results ( $p \leq .05$ ) indicated that the Kosovo conflict likely: disturbed many Greek citizens; increased refugee migration into Greece; raised cross-border crime; increased environmental contamination; and may not have improved overall combat readiness of Greek armed forces.

Additional conclusions indicated the following: post-Cold War international focus has shifted to a European perimeter, Balkan domain; threatening regional issues remain; and Greece's strategic role is expanding as a geographic and political peace-maker. Unofficial recommendations include: integrate Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) into the EU to facilitate a common Balkan and European approach to long-term regional peace and prosperity; and strengthen international rules on environmental protection in cases of military action.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>PROBLEM .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>SCOPE OF THE THESIS.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.	Primary Research Question .....	2
2.	Secondary Research Questions.....	2
<b>D.</b>	<b>METHODOLOGY .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>E.</b>	<b>STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>KOSOVO BACKGROUND FACTORS.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>BACKGROUND FACTORS.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>FROM THE PRE-HISTORIC AGE TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE .....</b>	<b>5</b>
1.	Origins of the Tribes.....	5
2.	The Rise of the Ottoman Empire.....	7
3.	After the Decline of the Ottoman Empire.....	8
4.	Serbia – Kosovo Identity and Development .....	10
<b>III.</b>	<b>INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS IN KOSOVO 1998-1999 .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN 1998-1999 .....</b>	<b>13</b>
1.	The Rambouillet Peace Talks .....	15
2.	Last Negotiations for Agreement.....	16
<b>B.</b>	<b>THE OPERATION “ALLIED FORCE”.....</b>	<b>16</b>
1.	The End of the Air Strikes .....	19
2.	The Peace Resolution.....	19
<b>IV.</b>	<b>KOSOVO AFTER OPERATION “ALLIED FORCE” .....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO (UNMIK).....</b>	<b>22</b>
1.	UNMIK Mission .....	22
2.	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Structure .....	23
3.	UNMIK Police and Kosovo Police Service .....	24
4.	Kosovo Protection Corps.....	24
<b>B.</b>	<b>KOSOVO FORCE (KFOR).....</b>	<b>25</b>
1.	KFOR Mission.....	25
2.	KFOR Structure.....	27
3.	Greek Contributions to KFOR.....	29
<b>V.</b>	<b>GREECE’S POST-KOSOVO CONFLICT FOREIGN POLICY .....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>STABILITY IN THE BALKANS .....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>GREECE’S FOREIGN STABILITY POLICY FOR RELATIONS WITH MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS .....</b>	<b>41</b>
1.	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.....	41

2.	Albania .....	45
3.	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) .....	54
4.	European Union (EU) .....	59
5.	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) .....	64
VI.	SURVEY DATA AND ANALYSIS .....	69
A.	INTRODUCTION .....	69
1.	Primary Research Question .....	69
2.	Secondary Research Questions .....	69
B.	METHODOLOGY .....	70
C.	SURVEY DATA OF GREEK OFFICERS .....	71
1.	Questions Referring to the Consequences of the Kosovo Conflict in Greece .....	71
2.	Questions Referring to the Greek Stability Policy for Security ....	74
VII.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	85
A.	CONCLUSIONS .....	85
1.	Conclusions Based on Survey Results .....	85
2.	Additional Conclusions .....	86
B.	RECOMMENDATIONS: AN UNOFFICIAL PERSPECTIVE .....	89
APPENDIX A.	SURVEY .....	93
A.	CHI-SQUARE TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE .....	93
B.	QUESTIONS .....	95
1.	Primary Research Question .....	95
2.	Secondary Research Questions .....	95
C.	SURVEY DATA .....	98
D.	SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS .....	99
APPENDIX B.	RESOLUTION 1199 (1998) .....	101
APPENDIX C.	MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT .....	105
APPENDIX D.	RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) .....	111
LIST OF REFERENCES	.....	117
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	.....	125

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Kosovo Map (From Ref. Elez Biberaj, Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg). ....	12
Figure 2.	Interlocking Political and Security Organizations of Europe (From Messervy-Whiting, Graham. 1997, WEU Operational Development. Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1997). ....	20
Figure 3.	UNMIK Structure, (From: UNMIK Available on line: <a href="http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo9.htm">http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo9.htm</a> ).....	23
Figure 4.	Multinational Brigades (MNB) Boundaries and MCO's. (From: Mine Action Coordination Centre, Reports and Documents. Available on line: <a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/macc/downloads/organization_location.pdf">http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/macc/downloads/organization_location.pdf</a> ). ....	31
Figure 5.	Communication Zone West. (From: NATO KFOR COMMZ WEST. Available on line: <a href="http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz_west.htm">http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz_west.htm</a> ) .....	32
Figure 6.	Communication Zone South. (From: NATO KFOR COMMZ SOUTH. Available on line: <a href="http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz_south.htm">http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz_south.htm</a> .....	33
Figure 7.	Former Yugoslav Republic. (From The New York Times. Available on line: ( <a href="http://www.pixelpress.org/bosnia/context/balkans-political.GIF.html">http://www.pixelpress.org/bosnia/context/balkans-political.GIF.html</a> ) .....	35
Figure 8.	The Balkans Regional Atlas. From the Central Intelligence Agency. Available on line: ( <a href="http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/balkan/register.html">http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/balkan/register.html</a> ) .....	36
Figure 9.	Major Stakeholders Map for Post-Kosovo Greek Foreign Policy. ....	39
Figure 10.	The Stability Pact Structure. (From: About the Stability Pact: <a href="http://www.stabilitypact.org/">http://www.stabilitypact.org/</a> ) .....	61
Figure A-1.	Goodness of Fit Test Formula.....	94
Figure A-2.	Chi-Square Critical Value for 1df.....	95

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## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Southeastern Europe Military Balance. (From National Institute for Strategic Studies. London 1996) .....	37
Table 2.	European Union Economic Assistance in EURO Spent in Kosovo. (From: European Union, The Challenge of the EU's Financial Contribution, Available on line: <a href="http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fry/kosovo/index.htm">http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fry/kosovo/index.htm</a> ).....	62
Table 3.	Reconstruction Assistance Implementation (as of 28 May 2001). (From: European Union, The Challenge of the EU's Financial Contribution, Available on line: <a href="http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fry/kosovo/index.htm">http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fry/kosovo/index.htm</a> ).....	62
Table 4.	Question 1 Results. ....	72
Table 5.	Question 2 Results. ....	72
Table 6.	Question 3 Results. ....	72
Table 7.	Question 4 Results. ....	73
Table 8.	Question 5 Results. ....	73
Table 9.	Question 6 Results. ....	74
Table 10.	Question 7 Results. ....	74
Table 11.	Question 8 Results. ....	76
Table 12.	Question 9 Results. ....	77
Table 13.	Question 10 Results. ....	79
Table 14.	Question 11 Results. ....	80
Table 15.	Question 12 Results. ....	82
Table A-1.	Chi-Square Critical values .....	94
Table A-2.	Survey Data.....	99
Table A-3.	Survey Data Analysis Results.....	100

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. PROBLEM**

The Balkans have been characterized as an unstable region and longstanding source of many ethnic conflicts. The Kosovo crisis that led to NATO military intervention on 24 March 1999 was a result of ethnic tension between Orthodox Christian Serbs and Muslim Albanians. The result ensures conflict lessened the overall safety and security of South-Eastern Europe. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999 halted NATO operations, and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) were established. Even with these large-scale interventions, Kosovo future remains problematic and a source of considerable international concern. This study examines the historical underpinnings of the Kosovo conflict, the relatively brief NATO military intervention, and implications for Greece. As part of this study, 35 Greek officers are surveyed on their perceptions concerning the topic.

### **B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS**

The geographical scope of this thesis concerns the following Balkan countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey (European part), Hungary, and Moldova, as well as countries created after the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991 including Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro). Kosovo as a Serbian province is also part of the Balkans. This study examines the Kosovo conflict in a regional context with particular emphasis on its genesis and progression, major stakeholders, the revival of nationalist pursuits, and the military intervention from NATO forces on March 1999. Of particular concern are implications for Greece, including emerging post-conflict perceptions and applicability towards Greek foreign policy.

### **C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The end of the Cold War and the demise of communism, although a victory for democratic Europe, revived an array of old and new problems for the region known as the Balkans. Problems emerged in several major areas: changing political identities; economic development and transformation; and conflicting ethnic minorities. The

Kosovo conflict was the crossroads for much of this complexity and turbulence. This study identifies aspects of the relationships emerging from the Kosovo conflict among relevant regional stakeholders in South-Eastern Europe. It focuses on the Greek perspective, including possible post-conflict consequences and Greece's central role in developing policies ensuring regional safety, security, and progress.

Research questions examined:

**1. Primary Research Question**

- How did the Kosovo conflict affect the relationships among relevant regional stakeholders and what are the implications for Greece.

**2. Secondary Research Questions**

- What were the critical factors leading up to the Kosovo conflict?
- What were the actions of the international community to solve the Kosovo conflict?
- Who are the major stakeholders emerging from the Kosovo conflict?
- What is the post-conflict status in Kosovo (i.e., post June 1999)
- What are possible post-conflict consequences to Greece, as perceived by Greek military officers, including foreign policy implications?

**D. METHODOLOGY**

The method of analysis is based on archival research of relevant articles and documents, and a researcher-developed Questionnaire administered to 35 Greek officers from three services attending the Naval Postgraduate School. Current government policies related to the Kosovo conflict's regional stakeholders were also reviewed. Stakeholder Analysis was applied as a strategic tool including construction of a stakeholder map. The questionnaire contained open and Likert-scaled questions to analyze the responses of 35 participants, i.e., a purposive sample was used. Finally, conclusions and recommendations were developed based on the data.

**E. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS**

This thesis is organized into the present chapter, Introduction, and six more chapters.

Chapter II provides an overview of the Kosovo background. It briefly presents Kosovo history from the pre-historic age to the Ottoman Empire by discussing the origin of Kosovo's inhabitant tribes, and major battles of Kosovo occupation. Relevant aspects

of World War I, World War II, and Kosovo's status under Tito's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including disintegration, are briefly reviewed. The NATO military intervention in 1999 is described.

Chapter III focuses on the international interventions and armed clashes by presenting the pro-Kosovo NATO military intervention, and the diplomatic efforts in Rambouillet and Paris. The NATO military intervention 'Allied Force' as well as the NATO air strikes and the United Nations Security Council Peace Resolution 1244, signaling the end of the war are also discussed.

Chapter IV outlines the present situation in Kosovo, i.e., operation under the auspices of United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Kosovo Force (KFOR). The chapter discusses the structure of these organizations, including their peace missions and administrative preparations to establish an autonomous government.

Chapter V identifies Kosovo conflict stakeholders and describes Greece's relations with the stakeholders in terms of foreign policy and security implications. After the definition of security in the Balkans is addressed, Greece's relations are examined with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), European Union (EU), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Chapter VI analyzes the data collected through a researcher-developed questionnaire administered to 35 Greek officers attending the Naval Postgraduate School. Their responses to Likert-scaled questions are analyzed using a Chi-Square goodness of Fit. Several open-ended questions were used to help explain some of the rationale behind their scaled-responses.

Chapter VII provides conclusions generated from the study, and brief recommendations concerning future Greek policy decisions.

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## **II. KOSOVO BACKGROUND FACTORS**

### **A. BACKGROUND FACTORS**

Geographically, the Kosovo area occupies approximately 4203 square miles of the western region of the Balkan Peninsula. This location, composed mostly of high round mountains, has considerable military strategic value. It could be the center of military concentrations which could be used to exert control over the routes connecting Central Europe and the Adriatic Sea with the East Mediterranean Sea.

Throughout history, this strategic value has been noticeable because of the crucial conflicts that took place among Christians and Ottomans in 1389 and 1448. A result of these ancient conflicts, the Ottoman Empire dominated the Balkan Peninsula (DCI, 1998)<sup>1</sup>. Additionally, because of its strategic value during the two world wars, multinational military powers showed substantial military and political interest in the Kosovo area. Augmenting its military value, the mineral-rich subsoil and underdeveloped plains make the region economically important as well. The area contains a large population of approximately two million people, including relatively cheap manpower, which makes the area important to the global marketplace. The region has received approximately \$2.1B in economic credits following the 1999 NATO air bombing campaign (The World Bank Group, 2001).<sup>2</sup>

These factors make Kosovo historically, militarily, and economically relevant on both a regional and global level.

### **B. FROM THE PRE-HISTORIC AGE TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE**

#### **1. Origins of the Tribes**

The Illyrians, who spoke an Indo-European language, were likely the first known inhabitants of the area known today as Kosovo (Vickers, 1998).<sup>3</sup> Among the Illyrians were the Pannonian and Dalmatian tribes who mixed with the Celtic and Thracian tribes.

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<sup>1</sup> Kosovo Intelligence Report, Office of DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, June 1998. Available on line, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/products/kosovo/index.html>.

<sup>2</sup> The World Bank Group. Yugoslavia Federal Republic of Serbia/ Montenegro. Available on line, <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/66d6f5004ed085ca852567d10011a8b8/491897f86aaa345f85256ad2004f5dd1?OpenDocument>.

<sup>3</sup> Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 1.

Research has proven that there was commercial contact with the Hellenic world towards the end of the 7<sup>th</sup> BC. The territory was under Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine, and Serbian rule (Malcom, 1999)<sup>4</sup> The region was conquered by Alexander the Great 300 years before Christ and became a part of the Roman province of Dardania in the 4<sup>th</sup> century AD (Jansen, 1999)<sup>5</sup>.

Late in the 6<sup>th</sup> and in the beginning of the 7<sup>th</sup> centuries AD, the Slavs, moving south from the Carpathian Mountains, crossed the Danube and attacked and conquered the Romans. The Serbs were part of this Slavic population. By the middle of the 7<sup>th</sup> century AD, the Serbs were settling northern Albania. By the 11<sup>th</sup> century AD, part of what is now Albania and the region of present day Kosovo, was in Slavic hands. The Slavs also found the Wallachians (Vlachs), Illyrians, Tracians, Dardanians and other settlers in the region. By that time, the Serbs were settled in a region north of Kosovo called Rashka. By the end of the 12<sup>th</sup> century AD, the Serbs moved south and settled the area of what is present day Kosovo (Vickers, 1998)<sup>6</sup>. Also, the Serbian population became dominant in what is present day Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the influence of the Byzantine Empire, the Serbs were largely Christianized and became Eastern Orthodox. Kosovo was repeatedly a point of dispute among the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Roman, and Byzantine leaders into the 12<sup>th</sup> AD century (DCI, 1998)<sup>7</sup>

In 1166, the Nemanjic dynasty emerged in Serbia. From 1180 to 1190, Stefan Nemanja and from 1331 to 1355 Stefan Dusan, were two of the most important men to reign. That era was the most powerful and glorious for the Serbians (Vickers, 1998).<sup>8</sup>

The Albanians are first mentioned in historical records in 1403 when they were described as being soldiers in a Byzantine Army. Albanians claim to be ancient

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<sup>4</sup> Malcom Noel, Kosovo. A Short History, 40. New York. Harper Perennial, Harper Collins Publishers, 1999.

<sup>5</sup> G. Richard Jansen. Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, An Abbreviated History, Colorado State University, 1999.

<sup>6</sup> Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 6.

<sup>7</sup> Kosovo Intelligence Report. Office of DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, June 1998. Available on line, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/products/kosovo/index.html>.

<sup>8</sup> Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 10.



Dardanians of the Illyrian people. Moreover, there is a historical debate about whether the Dardanians were Illyria or Thracian. On the other hand, Serbs claim that the Albanian population arrived in the Balkans in the 17<sup>th</sup> century AD. For this reason, the historical discussion of ancient Illyria has become a political debate. (Savich, 2000)<sup>9</sup>. In 1504, the northern part of Albania became Roman Catholic. Thus, there was one more reason for the confrontation among the Serbs and Albanians (Vickers, 1998)<sup>10</sup>.

## **2. The Rise of the Ottoman Empire**

The Nemanjic dynasty lasted 200 years. On June 28 1389, the Ottoman Turks in one of the greatest battles in history, defeated the Serbs. The Battle of Kosovo took place outside Pristina in Kosovo Polje which means the field of blackbirds in Serbian. (Savich, 2000).<sup>11</sup> This date dominates Serbian history. Serbian Prince Lazar then ruled Kosovo. On the night before the battle, Prince Lazar said:

Whoever is a Serb and of Serbian birth, and who does not come to Kosovo Polje to do battle against the Turks, let him have neither a male nor a female offspring, Let him have no crop,...<sup>12</sup>

The Serbs believe that because of this victorious battle of the Ottoman Turks that Turkish rule lasted for 500 years and forced them from Kosovo. By 1448, the Turks dominated the Balkan Peninsula. For the next five centuries, the entire region was under the Ottoman Empire. Before the invasion of the Ottoman Turks, the majority of Albanians and Serbs were still Christians. During Ottoman rule, the Empire was organized on the basis of religion. Muslims could obtain privileges and status. As a result, most of the people converted to Islam. As Carl Savich noted on the Albanian conversion to Islam, 'Albanians were able to gain social, political, and economic dominance in Kosovo' (Savic, 20000).<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Carl K. Savich, *The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History* Serbian National Defense, 2000, Available on line, [http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich\\_kosovo-origins.htm](http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich_kosovo-origins.htm).

<sup>10</sup> Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> Carl K. Savich, *The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History* Serbian National Defense, 2000. Available on line, [http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich\\_kosovo-origins.htm](http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich_kosovo-origins.htm).

<sup>12</sup> Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts*, St. Martin's Press, New York, N.Y., 1993, p. 39.

<sup>13</sup> Carl K. Savich, *The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History* Serbian National Defense, 2000. Available on line, [http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich\\_kosovo-origins.htm](http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich_kosovo-origins.htm).

Serbian lands were settled from Albanians through the process of Islamization. Under this process, the settling of lands achieved its greatest expansion. The Serbian Orthodox Church resisted conversion.

In the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, Austria grew stronger in the north. The wars between Austria and the Ottoman Empire, in 1690 and 1737-39, resulted in large Serbian migrations. They moved northward towards Belgrade. These great migrations changed the ethnic balance in Kosovo. In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, the Russians defeated the Ottomans. Following this event, the Albanian nationalist leaders called a meeting on June 10 1878 in Prizren. The 300 delegates founded what is known as “The Prizren League”. The main goal of this league was to unite all Albanians in the inhabited regions of the Balkans into a Greater Albania (Savich, 2000). Religion turned out to be the critical factor for status and position. The League of Prizren created a political agenda. The political goal was a united Albanian State. (Savich, 2000).<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, this league was to defeat any Christian adversary considered to be on Albanian lands. This league was the precursor of the country of Albania. The League of Prizren was established one night before the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. According to that treaty, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became independent, and the principality of Bulgaria was created. Slovenia and Croatia stayed under the rule of Austro-Hungarian Empire, which also took control of Bosnia-Herzegovina but later (Kohl-Libal, 1997).<sup>15</sup>

### **3. After the Decline of the Ottoman Empire**

By the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century AD, the power of the Ottoman Empire was waning. The First Balkan War started on 8 October 1912. Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece fought against the Ottoman Empire. After the end of this war, on 30 May 1913, the Balkan allies defeated the Ottoman Turks and Kosovo became a part of Serbia. After 500 years, Kosovo was again under Serbian sovereignty. After all those years, the population of Kosovo had changed and the largest ethnic group in Kosovo were the Muslims. (Savic, 2000)<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> Carl K. Savich, *The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History Serbian National Defense*, 2000. Available on line, [http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich\\_kosovo-origins.htm](http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich_kosovo-origins.htm).

<sup>15</sup> Kohl Christine von, and Wolfgang Libal. *Kosovo. The Gordian Knot of the Balkans*. In *Kosovo. In the Heart of the Powder Keg*. Ed. Robert Elsie, 9-12, New York: Boulder-Columbia University Press, 1997.

<sup>16</sup> Carl K. Savich, *The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History Serbian National Defense*, 2000. Available on line, [http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich\\_kosovo-origins.htm](http://www.snd-us.com/history/savich_kosovo-origins.htm).

The Second Balkan War started on 30 June 1913. Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and the Ottoman Empire fought against Bulgaria. After the end of this war, on 13 August 1913, Bulgaria was defeated. This time Serbia gained almost all of Macedonia while Bulgaria only gained a small portion (Vickers 1998)<sup>17</sup>.

In 1914, the Austria-Hungary Emperor's son and heir, Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo by a Serb nationalist. He wanted Slavs to be a barrier against Serbian expansionism. Thus, on 28 July 1914, war was declared between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. This war led to World War I. During World War I, the opposing sides were, on the one hand, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia with Greece joining the Entente Powers of France, Great Britain, and Russia, and on the other hand, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire which joined sides with the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary was defeated in World War I. On 1 December 1918, Kosovo became part of the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes". The name of the state was changed to Yugoslavia by King Alexander in 1929 (Vickers, 1998)<sup>18</sup>. Yugoslavia consisted of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The population of the Kingdom was 12 million people which constituted a Slavic state. Of them, 400,000 were Albanians. However, 64% of the population of Kosovo was Albanian. Atrocities took place between the Serbs and Albanians during this time. (Jansen, 1999).<sup>19</sup>

Albania and Croatia were opposed to the Serb monarchy, and on 15 January 1939, declared Croatia's independence from Belgrade. Also, Albanians, with Mussolini's approval, opposed the Serbs until April 1939, when Mussolini's 30,000 strong Italian army invaded Albania. The Italian Army developed strong forces in Albania.

In June 1940, Italy declared war on England and France. On 28 October 1940, Italy attacked Greece. Greek forces defeated the Italian Army and routed them back into Albania. After this loss, Italy asked for German assistance. During World War II, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria joined the Axis powers in 1941 and Yugoslavia joined

<sup>17</sup> Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, pp. 62-855.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> G. Richard Jansen. *Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, An Abbreviated History*. Colorado State University, 1999.

the Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan on 25 March 1941. Two days later, on 27 March 1941, Yugoslavia reconsidered its statement and left the Pact. On 6 April 1941, the Axis forces invaded Yugoslavia. Croatia welcomed the Axis forces. Croatian Fascists, along with the Germans, killed thousands of Serbs. German forces occupied Serbia, Macedonia and Greece. Italian forces occupied Montenegro. Albanian forces occupied Kosovo. Yugoslavia resisted the German forces with two main leaders. One was General Mihailovic with his Loyalist Chetnicks and the other was the head of the Communist Party Josip Broz Tito with his Partisans (Jansen, 1999)<sup>20</sup>. These Partisans later became the dominant force in Yugoslavia.

#### **4. Serbia – Kosovo Identity and Development**

In November 1945, Tito established Yugoslavia as a Federal Republic. The Federation consisted of six equal republics. These republics were Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Kosovo was recognized as an autonomous region under the Federal Republic. Later in 1974, Tito gave Kosovo and Vojvodina, the two regions inside Serbia, autonomous status and considered them equal to the other republics. In Kosovo, there was an explosion of births among low income Albanians. Tito assisted Kosovo with a constant flow of money and yielded an aggressive campaign to reverse the educational deficiencies of the Kosovars. Tito's decision to name Kosovo and Vojvodina as autonomous regions was strongly criticized by the Serbians.

On 4 May 1980, Tito died. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had survived for ten years. Kosovar Albanians felt alone without any protection. From the mid 1980's, the tension and polarization between Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs increased. Kosovo realized full autonomy in all areas in the period from 1974 until the late 1980's. This autonomy did not satisfy the Kosovar Albanians. As Richard Jansen noticed, some wanted status as a republic within Yugoslavia, while others favored unification in a "Greater Albania" with Albania along with Albanians from Macedonia and Montenegro (Jansen, 1999)<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> G. Richard Jansen, *Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, An Abbreviated History*, Colorado State University, 1999.

<sup>21</sup> G. Richard Jansen, *Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, An Abbreviated History*, Colorado State University, 1999.

In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic came to power in Serbia. He did not like the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. He began to support legislation that would ensure Serbian control over these provinces. These rules caused the exaltation of the Kosovar Albanians who represented 88 percent of the entire Kosovo population. Albanian students staged a series of violent protests in Pristina in 1981 in order to express their frustration with the new Milocevic regime. Ethnic Albanian students and numerous Serb policemen were killed during the violence (Washington Post, 1981)<sup>22</sup>.

In 1989, deprived of their autonomy, the Albanians established an underground government in Kosovo. The Serbs tolerated the existence of this shadow state because of its invisibility. The president of this resistance was a university professor named Dr. Ibrahim Rugova. On 23 December 1989, he founded the League for a Democratic Kosovo (LDK) (Vickers, 1998).<sup>23</sup> In 1990, Milosevic canceled the autonomy given to Kosovo and Vojvodina, and Serbia took executive control. Under the Serbian constitution, these provinces became a region in Serbia. During the following years of 1991-93, Kosovar Albanians and Serbs were living completely separated from each other. The economy was in bad shape. By 1993, 400,000 Albanians had left Kosovo because of the bad economic situation (Jansen, 1999)<sup>24</sup>. The social and economic deterioration forced Albanians to shift from passive resistance and civil disobedience to the use of terrorism in open rebellion against Serbian rule. In February 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged. The KLA started an armed campaign for the independence of Kosovo with a series of bombing attacks on selected Serbian targets. In October 1996, the KLA claimed responsibility for killing a civilian and a Serb policeman (Kosovo Daily Report, 1997).<sup>25</sup> In response to the KLA's actions, the Serbian authorities started the systematic expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.

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<sup>22</sup> The Washington Post, article: Yugoslavs Take Emergency Steps In Face of Ethnic Disturbance, 3 April 1981.

<sup>23</sup> Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 249.

<sup>24</sup> G. Richard Jansen, *Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, An Abbreviated History*, Colorado State University, 1999.

<sup>25</sup> Kosovo Daily Report. 31 August 1997. Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/kosova/97-01-21/ksv.html>.

Serbian inflexibility, the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the communication barrier between the Serbs and Albanians weakened the chances for a peaceful future in Kosovo. Figure 1 shows the Kosovo province.



Figure 1. Kosovo Map (From Ref. Elez Biberaj, Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg).

### **III. INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS IN KOSOVO 1998-1999**

Albania's communistic political system followed the trend of the dissolution of communism in East Europe and collapsed. This collapse started in 1989 and climaxed in March 1997 along with an economic recession. There were persistent disorders and a loss of normality. The situation deteriorated further when some civilian groups took arms from the military depots. After this event, the political authority passed to these armed civilians (Amnesty Report).<sup>26</sup>

These circumstances also gave the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members the chance to remove a large number of military assets, such as guns, explosives, and grenades, from Albania's army depots. The now militarily empowered KLA started to engage the Serbian authorities in a civil war for independence. At that time, the U.S. had advised the leader of the Sovereign for a Democratic Kosovo party, Ibrahim Rugova, that Kosovo should remain a part of Serbia. However, public opinion among the Kosovars was divided and merely against Rugova. Essentially, the people had to choose between Rugova's non-violent and therefore political approach and the KLA's radical approach. By that time, the situation in Kosovo was one of rising ethnic violence, suppression of democracy, breakdown of law and order, systematic human rights abuses by the ruling authorities, and a refusal by the Belgrade government to seek, or accept, a political solution.

#### **A. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN 1998-1999**

In February 1998, a civil war began between the KLA and the Serbian authorities. During the first six months of this civil war in Kosovo, various organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community (EC) and the United Nations (UN) as well as European countries on their own were searching for a peaceful diplomatic solution. A "Contact Group on Kosovo" was established by representatives from Germany, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the U.S.. In March 1998, they decided that the presence of international observers in Kosovo would

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<sup>26</sup> Amnesty International 1998 Annual Report on Albania. Available on line, <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar98/eur11.htm>.

lead to an improvement of the present status of Kosovo within Serbia, and would stop the killing of the Serbian population.

NATO and the international community were ultimately prepared to use force to reach their peaceful solution for Kosovo and made this clear to President Milosevic. Experience had taught that diplomacy without the threat of force would be wasted on Milosevic.

The first approach was a call to all parties to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The Yugoslav forces seriously considered the NATO warning of military aircraft demonstration flights, but it was the KLA that accelerated their own military action, ultimately resulting in a Serb counter-offensive in late summer which was conducted in an indiscriminate manner. During 1998, open conflict between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovar Albanian forces resulted in the deaths of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and forced 400,000 people from their homes (NATO Website 2002).<sup>27</sup>

In October 1998, diplomatic efforts started again. NATO ministers called on all parties to seek a peaceful resolution to the crisis, while directing the Alliance's military authorities to prepare options for the use of force, should it prove necessary (NATO website, 2002)<sup>28</sup>. In addition, the North Atlantic Council authorized the activation orders for air strikes against Yugoslavia on 13 October by passing Resolution 1119. This resolution expressed concerns about the excessive use of force by Serb security forces, and the humanitarian catastrophe (Resolution 1119 Website).<sup>29</sup> Also, KLA and Serb authorities were asked to impose a cease-fire. This was a further attempt to convince President Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and to cooperate in bringing an end to the violence.

On 27 October, Milosevic had complied with NATO's demands for withdrawing the bulk of his military forces from Kosovo. Furthermore, he allowed 1800 UN observers into Kosovo, and finally agreed that NATO aircrafts were allowed to use the airspace

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<sup>27</sup> NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict In Kosovo. Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B>.

<sup>28</sup> NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict In Kosovo. Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B>.

<sup>29</sup> NATO Resolution 1119. Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u980923a.htm>.



over Serbia and Kosovo to carry out surveillance flights. In return, Milošević demanded from NATO the lifting of their authorization to carry out air strikes against military objects in Serbia and Kosovo, which was rejected by NATO officials. NATO's rejection of Milošević's demands was interpreted by the KLA that NATO was on their side (Jansen 1999)<sup>30</sup>. Once again, the violence flared up. This time, the Serbian authorities were in a fight against the 'terrorists' of the KLA. Large scale acts of violence as well as provocative acts were committed by both sides. Reports from Pristina in January 1999 indicate that human rights abuses by both sides were documented. Killing and destruction could be witnessed at an horrific level (War Child)<sup>31</sup>.

As a result of all this violence and crimes committed, the October agreement between NATO and President Milošević became invalid (Jansen 1999).<sup>32</sup>

### **1. The Rambouillet Peace Talks**

Based on the experiences from Bosnia in 1995, NATO had gained some experience in this area. Compared to the Bosnian conflict, NATO this time was more united and showed a greater readiness to intervene in the Kosovo conflict. The next step, after the voided October 1998 agreement, took place in Rambouillet, France on 6 February 1999. The Contact Group on the former Yugoslavia (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) came together in Rambouillet to discuss further steps of action in order to reach a solution about the Kosovo area (NATO Website 2002).<sup>33</sup>

On 28 January 1999, NATO officially warned Serbian President Milošević that it was ready to use military force immediately in order to achieve the desired outcome in the conflict. In addition, France and Britain announced that they were ready to send ground forces into Serbia and Kosovo to enforce a peace settlement. In Rambouillet, from 6 to 23 February 1999, the Western Allies, led by the United States, issued a two-

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<sup>30</sup>Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo An Abbreviated History. G. Richard Jansen. Colorado State University. Available on line, <http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html>.

<sup>31</sup> War Child Articles Bulletin 6. Available on line, <http://www.warchild.org/news/bull6/kosovo.html>.

<sup>32</sup> Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo An Abbreviated History. G. Richard Jansen. Colorado State University. Available on line, <http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html>.

<sup>33</sup> NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo. Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B>.

week deadline, threatening air strikes, during which time both parties, (the Yugoslavians and the representatives of the major Albanian Kosovar groups that demanded independence) had to agree to the proposed settlement. This settlement, dictated by the West, required Yugoslavia to withdraw its forces from Kosovo, and the KLA to lay down their arms. In addition, NATO peacekeeping troops would enforce the agreement with a three-year period to settle the political future of Kosovo. Yugoslavia believed that within three years after the required referendum it would be forced to grant Kosovo complete independence, the stated goal of the KLA. Settlement actually required Yugoslavia to surrender many aspects of its national sovereignty to NATO. It is therefore not surprising that Yugoslavia was unwilling to sign the Rambouillet document. Neither side would agree and the bombing deadline was extended two weeks (Jancen, 1999).<sup>34</sup>

## **2. Last Negotiations for Agreement**

The follow up conference was held in Paris two weeks later from 15 to 18 March 1999. Initially both Kosovars and Serbs had serious concerns again about the agreement, but finally the Kosovars accepted the proposed plan, while the Serbs would not agree to it. Since Milosevic was not willing to sign the peace agreement, on 22 March, President Clinton dispatched Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade for one last meeting with Milosevic. During these talks, Milosevic accused the United States of sitting on the Albanian side of the table (Weller 1999)<sup>35</sup> His view was that the inevitable outcome of the three-year period to determine the fate of Kosovo would be the severing of Kosovo from Serbia which was an outcome he could not accept. Holbrooke asked him if he knew what his refusal to agree to the “Rambouillet Accord” meant. Milosevic replied, “You are going to bomb us”. Holbrooke said “that’s right”, and the bombing started on 24 March 1999 (Jansen 1999)<sup>36</sup>.

## **B. THE OPERATION “ALLIED FORCE”**

In his statement of 24 March 1999, the UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan reacted to NATO’s military actions against Yugoslavia. He deeply regretted that, in spite

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<sup>34</sup> Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo An Abbreviated History. G. Richard Jansen. Colorado State University. Available on line, <http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html>.

<sup>35</sup> Marc Weller. The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999. Ambassador Holbrooke, Interview on ABC’s Nightline, March 24, 1999, p. 496 (1999).

<sup>36</sup> Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo An Abbreviated History. G. Richard Jansen. Colorado State University. Available on line, <http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html>.

of all the efforts made by the international community, the Yugoslav authorities had persisted in their rejection of a political settlement, which would have halted the bloodshed in Kosovo and secured an equitable peace for the population there. “It is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace”. UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan made clear that Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter had been engaged to enforce the peace in Serbia and Kosovo and that NATO in this case only had responded to maintain international peace and security. Additionally he indicated that the UN Council should be involved in any decision to resort to the use of force (Weller, 1999)<sup>37</sup> Based on the support of the UN officials and international law, NATO started military operations in Kosovo intended to end the ethnic cleansing and killing, and persuade Serbian forces to withdraw.

The campaign was conducted with air power only. NATO forces chose to execute a predictable air campaign from a safe distance. The targets selected were intended to cause both tactical and strategic results. The overall number of combat sorties flown was 38,000 with no Allied combat fatalities. In general, the campaign was designed to minimize friendly casualties and collateral damage. (NATO Website Air Campaign 2002).<sup>38</sup>

Initially, it was very important to defeat the Serb air defense network. Later, the main efforts were directed against tactical targets such as military vehicles, heavy weapons and military depots. Despite the high technology weapon systems in the campaign, some obstacles made the operations difficult. The poor weather conditions, some special characteristics of the area, and the preparedness and mobility of the Serbian forces were primary concerns in the campaign. Great effort was made to minimize civilian casualties. Thus, NATO’s targeting had to go through all the levels of military command, as well as the Alliance’s political level. There was, therefore, military justification and a minimization of civilian risk. Nevertheless, some unavoidable damage

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<sup>37</sup> Marc Weller. The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999. Statement made by the UN Secretary-General on NATO Military Action against Yugoslavia, 24 March 1999, p. 498 (1999).

<sup>38</sup> NATO The Conduct of Air Campaign. Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/conduct.htm>.

occurred to civilian property. According to the Human Rights organization in 90 separate incidents, 500 Yugoslav civilians are known to have died (Human Rights Watch).<sup>39</sup>

In his statement of 2 June 1999, two months after the beginning of the air strikes, General Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, gave a statement on the operations. He said that Allied aircrafts could fly without any restriction, because they had targeted the integrated Serbian air defense systems. The critical Serbian control points as well as the petroleum productions and reserves had been destroyed. Furthermore he gave some numbers that designated the size of the of the air strikes capability. About 40 percent of the Serbian fuel stocks were gone, along with 30 percent of fuel storage capacity. Also substantial numbers of Serbian heavy equipment, aircrafts, surface-to-air missile sites, and ammunition storage sites had been destroyed (SACEUR General Clark).<sup>40</sup>

NATO expected Yugoslavia to capitulate and sign the Rambouillet Agreement. Instead of surrendering, Yugoslavia stepped up its war with the KLA and close to a million Kosovars were driven out of Kosovo, mostly by the Serbs, but also, by the bombing itself. Many of the homes were burned. The bombing lasted 77 days, and this period set the Yugoslavian economy back by at least a decade (Dobbs Washington Post 1999).<sup>41</sup>

NATO had an open investigation policy any time that there was some “mistaken bombing”, as in the case of the Chinese Embassy, by publicizing as much as possible about the details of the accidents. This policy was in contrast with Milocevic’s expression of information based on distortion and propaganda. Even though in a war it is generally unrealistic for all risks to be minimized, this goal was seriously attempted.

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<sup>39</sup> Human Rights Watch “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign.” In Human Rights Watch, Vol. 2, No. 1:92. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund. Available on line, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/> 19 February 2000.

<sup>40</sup> Effectiveness and Determination. Article by General Wesley K. Clark, SACEUR. Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/articles/a990602a.htm>.

<sup>41</sup> Washington Post. Global Focus Q&A With A Post Reporter. Available on line, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/zforum/99/dobbs060499.htm>.

## **1. The End of the Air Strikes**

NATO had made it clear the actions Milosevic was expected to accomplish in order for the bombing to stop. These actions were:

- ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces
- agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence
- agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations<sup>42</sup>

On 10 June 1999, after an air campaign lasting 77 days, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana announced that he had instructed General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to temporarily suspend NATO's air operations against Yugoslavia. This decision was taken after consultations with the North Atlantic Council and confirmation from General Clark that Yugoslavia had started to meet the above conditions (NATO website, 2002).<sup>43</sup>

## **2. The Peace Resolution**

On 10 June, 1999 the UN Security Council passed a resolution (UNSCR 1244), with 14 in favor and none against with China abstaining, in which it welcomed Yugoslavia's acceptance of a political solution to the Kosovo crisis by ending the violence and a rapid removal of all their forces from Kosovo. According to Resolution 1244, the United Nations had to deploy international civil and security presences in Kosovo under their auspices. The Security Council authorized member states as well as other relevant international organizations to create a force for an international presence. This presence was to assure security, deter new violence, and demilitarize the KLA forces. The next mission NATO had to undertake was to bring the refugees back home and to facilitate a sustainable peace. Thus, one of the main jobs the new international force had to accomplish was to secure the environment for return of the refugees. The entire responsibility for the formation of the new international force passed to the UN

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<sup>42</sup> "The Aims of the Campaign", Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/aims.htm>.

<sup>43</sup> NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict In Kosovo. Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B>.

Secretary General who selected a Special Representative to control its formation (NATO Website 2002)<sup>44</sup>. Figure 2 shows the Political and Security Organizations of Europe.




Figure 2. Interlocking Political and Security Organizations of Europe (From Messervy-Whiting, Graham. 1997, WEU Operational Development. Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1997).

<sup>44</sup> NATO's Role In Relation To The Conflict In Kosovo. Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B>

#### **IV. KOSOVO AFTER OPERATION “ALLIED FORCE”**

On June 9 1999, the commanders of NATO and Yugoslavia signed a Military Technical Agreement. Under the terms of this agreement, the Yugoslav Army and its police forces left Kosovo. On the next day, June 10 1999, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana postponed NATO’s air operations against Yugoslavia after confirmation from the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark of the Yugoslav departure. The same day, June 10 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244.

This resolution adopted two main provisions to facilitate a political solution to the crisis. These were the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). These two provisions operate under their leadership with specific tasks to restore normal life to Kosovo. They are partners in an international effort to restore Kosovo’s structure and make it a democratic society. UNMIK is establishing an interim civilian administration under which Kosovars could progressively enjoy substantial autonomy (UNMIK KOSOVO).<sup>45</sup> KFOR is establishing and maintaining a secure environment, including public safety and order (NATO KFOR).<sup>46</sup>

The 28 national forces that entered Kosovo and formed KFOR tried to control the situation by protecting the refugees that had to be moved, and securing the small areas for the Serb minority people. This multinational force included Russian forces. Under a special Agreement for Russian Participation, Russia agreed to participate in KFOR.

Under the international law that UNMIK and KFOR enforce in the area, Kosovo is still to be a part of Serbia and the Yugoslavian Republic, but until this is accomplished, the pre-war states of Serbia and Yugoslavia cannot be restated. These international forces (UNMIK, KFOR) will designate the time for passing authority bases to the Yugoslav government.

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<sup>45</sup> UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO (UNMIK). Available on line, <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo12.htm>.

<sup>46</sup> KFOR information, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/default.htm>.

## **A. UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO (UNMIK)**

In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, the Secretary General established an interim civilian administration UNMIK, led by the UN, in order to obtain a future staged settlement for full autonomy in Kosovo.

All the principle administrative functions such as law and order, health, mail, education and so forth are performed by UNMIK.

### **1. UNMIK Mission**

The specific mission of UNMIK is derived from paragraph 11 of the Security Council Resolution 1244 and proposing the following:

- Performance of basic civilian administrative functions
- Promotion of the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo
- Facilitation of a political process to determine Kosovo's future status
- Coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies
- Support of the reconstruction of key infrastructure
- Maintenance of civil law and order
- Promotion of human rights
- Assurance of safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo (UNMIK KOSOVO)<sup>47</sup>

The senior international civilian official in Kosovo is the UNSRSG, the United Nation Special Representative of the Secretary. The first was Dr. Bernard Kouchner from France until January 2001. The present representative of UNSRSG is Mr. Hans Haekkerup from Denmark. (UNMIK MISSION)<sup>48</sup>

UNMIK has accepted the former war legislation in Kosovo which would happen in any case since it does not contradict the national acceptance of Human Rights or UNMIK's formed rules.

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<sup>47</sup> UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION MISSION IN KOSOVO (UNMIK), Available on line, <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo12.htm>.

<sup>48</sup> Head of UN Mission, Available on line, <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo5.htm>.



## 2. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Structure

In order for UNMIK to execute its mandated mission, the appropriate structure had to be created. Under the UNSRSG, there are four pillars and each has a specific area of responsibility.

- Pillar I: Police and Justice, under the direct leadership of the United Nations
- Pillar II: Civil Administration, under the direct leadership of the United Nations
- Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building, led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union (EU) (UNMIK MISSION)<sup>49</sup>

In order to better execute the administrative tasks and coordinate the pillars' functionality, UNMIK divided the Kosovo area into five Regional Administrators and 30 Municipal Administrators. Pristina, Pek, Prizren, Gnilane and Kosovka-Mitrovitsa are the cities of the headquarters of each of the five Regional Administrators respectively.

Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of the UNMIK structure with the four pillars.




Figure 3. UNMIK Structure, (From: UNMIK Available on line: <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo9.htm>).

<sup>49</sup> Head of UN Mission, Available on line, <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo5.htm>.

### **3. UNMIK Police and Kosovo Police Service**

UNMIK created an international force called the UNMIK police. Total manpower strength is 3,600, which includes 1,100 special police for crowd control and other special duties as well as 200 border police. The special police include personnel from Pakistan (115), Jordan (240), and India (115).

The functions that the UNMIK police offer are various and consist of police as well as non-police tasks. The police tasks are investigations, street patrols, public order, traffic control and policing borders. The non-police tasks include guarding banks, money transfers, security of humanitarian convoys, judicial personnel and VIP protection.

The main concern of the UNMIK police is fighting organized crime. A broad intelligence structure has begun to be established. The cooperation of this organization with international police will bring the anticipated reduction in organized crime.

The total number of UNMIK police is not sufficient to respond to all needs. The international police account for about 77 percent of the necessary strength which is well below the desired minimum level. Thus, the UNMIK police cooperate with KFOR in areas where there is a lack of personnel for implementing law enforcement. Many joint operations have been initiated between police and military officers. This cooperation benefits the UNMIK police because it uses personnel and resources from the military KFOR force.

The UNMIK police created a sub-section responsible for the development of the force. This sub-section cooperated with the Kosovo Police Service School, a new school initiated and funded by OSCE, with an initial plan to train and deploy 2,000 police officers by January 2001. The officers that finish the Kosovo Police Service School are trained with UNMIK police officers for 19 weeks. These new officers will constitute the Kosovo Police Service and will be the future police of Kosovo (UNMIK).<sup>50</sup>

### **4. Kosovo Protection Corps**

According to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, one of the conditions for the settlements implemented after the end of the war was for the Kosovo Liberation Army to

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<sup>50</sup> UNMIK Police Services, Available on line, <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/twelvemonths/civpol.html>.

lay down its arms. This was very challenging to the UNMIK and KFOR, which were the international forces responsible for returning normal life to Kosovo. It was difficult to change the former soldiers to civilians. The potential and the energy of the demilitarized former KLA manpower had to be reassigned.

Under a joint effort, UNMIK and KFOR leaders created a transformation plan for the conversion of former KLA members into current Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) members. KPC was the major organization that could take in the large number of KLA members. The Kosovo Protection Corps was established on a provisional basis on 20 September 1999 as a beginning of the transformation plan to prevent soldiers from turning to crime. The members of this force were the former members of the KLA. The KPC's mission was to provide an emergency response against any natural or man-made disasters and to assist in the reconstruction of Kosovo.

The KPC was officially created in an inaugural ceremony on 21 January 2000. At this time, the KLA had met all the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The number of active KPC members was 3,000 and there was also a support branch of 2,000. UNMIK had the full authority of the KPC and KFOR maintained day-to-day control (NATO KOSOVO PROTECTION FORCE).<sup>51</sup>

## **B. KOSOVO FORCE (KFOR)**

Under the implementation of the Military Technical Agreement signed by NATO and Yugoslav commanders on 9 June 1999, stating that the Yugoslav army and police had to withdraw from Kosovo, and in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, the North Atlantic Council authorized the deployment of a security force in Kosovo. The security force entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 through an operation named Joint Guardian. By 20 June, this force was fully established in Kosovo. This security force constituted the Kosovo Force (KFOR) (NATO KOSOVO HISTORY).<sup>52</sup>

### **1. KFOR Mission**

In accordance with UNSCR 1244, the mission of KFOR is to:

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<sup>51</sup> Kosovo Protection Force, Available on line, <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/twelvemonths/kpc.html>.

<sup>52</sup> NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>.

- Establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order
- Monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the conditions of the Military Technical Agreement and the UCK Undertaking
- Provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), including core civil functions until they are transferred to UNMIK (NATO KFOR OBJECTIVES)<sup>53</sup>

Today, KFOR has more than 50,000 personnel. These individuals come from 28 different NATO and non-NATO countries. They are well equipped and well trained. Therefore, they are a deterrent to any possible hostilities between NATO and Yugoslav forces. Furthermore, the force is ready to confront any such future hostility.

KFOR tries hard to maintain a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. In the beginning, the interethnic minorities crime rate was 50 per week. Now the rate is four per week, a number which indicates KFOR's improvement in supplying security for minorities (NATO FACTS).<sup>54</sup> However, in this area, cooperation with UNMIK must continue in order to improve the court and judicial system.

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), KFOR's presence has allowed a total of 900,000 people to return to Kosovo (NATO FACTS).<sup>55</sup>

The close cooperation with UNMIK's first pillar, the Police and Justice under the direct leadership of the United Nations, provides humanitarian assistance. Not one person lacked food or shelter during the intense Balkan winters. Also, 300,000 children returned to school (NATO REPORTS).<sup>56</sup>

Although the main purpose of KFOR is to create a secure environment, this force contributes much to the functions of UNMIK because of its skills and manpower. Thus, the cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK becomes stronger and increases interdependence. KFOR's participation in UNMIK's responsibilities is evident in public

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<sup>53</sup> KFOR Objectives/Mission, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/objectives.htm>.

<sup>54</sup> Kosovo Facts and Figures, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/kosovo-ff.htm>.

<sup>55</sup> Kosovo Facts and Figures, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/kosovo-ff.htm>.

<sup>56</sup> The Job is not Yet Done: Assessing Remaining Challenges, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/assessin.htm>.

works projects, construction, mine clearance and medical services for example. (NATO KFOR MISSION)<sup>57</sup>

## **2. KFOR Structure**

KFOR consists of the Main Headquarters, the Rear Headquarters, five multinational brigades, the Multinational Specialized Unit and the Greek Force Support Brigade. Personnel include 50,000 men and women. Of them, nearly 40,000 troops from over 30 countries are deployed in Kosovo. There are 7,500 more that supply the rear support through contingents based in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Greece (NATO KFOR STRUCTURE)<sup>58</sup>

The Main Headquarters of KFOR is located in Pristina. Since 3 October 2001 the KFOR Commander has been Lt. Gen. Marcel Valentin (FR). KFOR HQ reports to the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) - Naples, Italy (NATO KFOR HEADQUARTERS).<sup>59</sup> The Rear Headquarters are located in Scopje, the capital city of FYROM. The Commander is Major General Gunnar Lange (DA, Army) (NATO KFOR HEADQUARTERS).<sup>60</sup>

The five multinational brigades (MNB) are located in different cities in Kosovo. Specifically, the MNB Centre is located in Pristina. The Commander is Brigadier D J Rutherford – Jones UK Army (NATO MNB CENTRE).<sup>61</sup> The MNB North is located in Mitrovica and the Commander is Brigadier General Jérôme Millet FR, Army (NATO MNB NORTH).<sup>62</sup> The MNB South is located in Prizren. The Commander is Brigadier General Alois M. Bach GE, Army (NATO MNB SOUTH).<sup>63</sup> The MNB West is located in Pec. The Commander is Brigadier General Giovanni Di Federico IT, Army (NATO

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<sup>57</sup> KFOR Objectives/Mission, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/objectives.htm>.

<sup>58</sup> KFOR Structure, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/structure.htm>.

<sup>59</sup> KFOR Headquarters Main, Available on line, [http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/kfor\\_hq.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/kfor_hq.htm).

<sup>60</sup> KFOR Headquarters Rear, Available on line, [http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/kfor\\_hq\\_rear.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/kfor_hq_rear.htm).

<sup>61</sup> Multinational Brigade Centre, Available on line, [http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb\\_centre.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb_centre.htm).

<sup>62</sup> Multinational Brigade North, Available on line, [http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb\\_north.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb_north.htm).

<sup>63</sup> Multinational Brigade South, Available on line, [http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb\\_south.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb_south.htm).

MNB WEST).<sup>64</sup> The MNB East is located in Urosevac. The Commander is Brigadier General William C. David US, Army (NATO MNB EAST).<sup>65</sup>

Each of the brigades is in charge of a particular area of operations and their relationship of command is single chain. Therefore, the brigades are under the authority of Commander KFOR Lt. Gen. Marcel Valentin (FR). All brigades have the same objective of maintaining a secure environment in Kosovo (NATO KFOR STRUCTURE).

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Furthermore, there is a Multinational Specialized Unit, which is a Military Police Force. It has military status with an overall police capability. The contributing nations are Italy, France and Estonia. The scope of this unit is to provide KFOR with the necessary expertise in personnel and tools for criminal investigations. The home base is the contributing countries and the Commander is Colonel IT Carabinieri Emanuele Garelli.

There are also two Communication Zones in KFOR. They are subordinate commands of KFOR NATO and maintain the lines of communication (LOC). The Communications Zone West (Information) maintains LOC throughout Albania and along the Albania-Kosovo border. It is located in Durres, Albania. The Commander is Brigadier General Antonino Cecconi IT, Army (NATO COMMZ WEST).<sup>67</sup> The Communication Zone South also coordinates movements and transportation needed for KFOR from the south. It is located in Thessaloniki, Greece. The Commander is Colonel Nikolaos Vitos GR, Army (NATO COMMZ SOUTH).<sup>68</sup>

Russian participation was initiated under a special Agreement for Russian Participation. The Secretary of Defense of the United States and the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation agreed to Russia's participation in KFOR. Russia had to meet some specific principles. These principles were common mission/purpose, common rules of engagement, Unity of Command, Single Airspace Management, Single System of Ground Movement Control, Intelligence Sharing and Exchange, Coordinated Public

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<sup>64</sup> Multinational Brigade West, Available on line, [http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb\\_west.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb_west.htm).

<sup>65</sup> Multinational Brigade East, Available on line, [http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb\\_east.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/mnb_east.htm).

<sup>66</sup> KFOR Structure, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/structure.htm#macedonia>.

<sup>67</sup> Communication Zone (West), Available on line, [http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz\\_west.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz_west.htm).

<sup>68</sup> Communication Zone (South), Available on line, [http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz\\_south.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz_south.htm).

Information Process, Single System to Coordinate National Logistics and KFOR Base Support, KFOR Freedom of Manoeuvre and Operation, and Command Structure. (NATO KFOR DOCUMENTS)<sup>69</sup> Today, the Russian troops contribute to the Multinational Brigades MNB Centre, MNB North, MNB South, and MNB East (NATO STRUCTURE).<sup>70</sup> The above agreement took place in Helsinki on 1 - 18 June 1999. It is thus known as the Helsinki Agreement (NATO KFOR DOCUMENTS)<sup>71</sup>

### **3. Greek Contributions to KFOR**

Greece, by following the development of the Kosovo crisis, contributed to KFOR in many ways. First, after the Military Technical Agreement and UN Resolution 1244, the Greece Governmental Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense decided on 11 June 1999 to participate in KFOR in Kosovo at a brigade level contingent named **Greek Force Support Unit (GFSU)** (NATO GFSU).<sup>72</sup>

The GFSU consisted of the 34<sup>th</sup> Greek Motorized Infantry Brigade with a manpower strength of 1,676 personnel. On 15 June 1999, the Greek Motorized Infantry Brigade left Greece and moved northwest to meet the KFOR forces. On 25 August 1999, the Motorized Infantry Battalion joined the Multinational Brigade East (MNB-EAST) in Urosevac. The rest of the Greek Motorized Infantry Brigade with the headquarters moved and located in Kosovo Polje. On 6 September 1999, the Greek Force Support Unit (GFSU) had fully deployed under the KFOR force as the **Force Support Brigade**.

The mission of the Greek Force Support Unit is to support the KFOR forces. Thus, the Greek Force Support Unit acts in all sectors of the five Multinational Brigades (MNB) (ΓΕΕΘΑ, 2000).<sup>73</sup>

The tasks of the GFSU are as follows:

- Monitor, verify and enforce as necessary the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement in order to secure a safe and secure environment

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<sup>69</sup> Agreed Principles for Russian Participation in the International Security Force (KFOR) for Kosovo, Available on line, [http://www.nato.int/kfor/resources/documents/helsinki\\_att1.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/resources/documents/helsinki_att1.htm).

<sup>70</sup> KFOR Structure, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/structure.htm>.

<sup>71</sup> Agreed Points in Russian Participation in KFOR, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/resources/documents/helsinki.htm>.

<sup>72</sup> Greek Force Support Unit, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/gfsu.htm>.

<sup>73</sup> ΓΕΕΘΑ Τμήμα ενημέρωσης τύπου ΕΛΔΥΚΟ.

- Establish and support the resumption of core civil functions
- Provide combat support and combat service support throughout the KFOR area of operation in order to facilitate COMKFOR's mission
- Assist in the movement and destruction of confiscated weapons, including EOD support
- Assist UNMIK in the reestablishment of civil infrastructure
- Provide response to traffic accidents and incidents
- Provide convoy escorts as directed
- Perform medical exams and evacuation of population of Kosovo
- Provision of security on board passenger trains from Kosovo Polje to Zvecan and back
- Provide administrative rides to KFOR by helicopters<sup>74</sup>

Some of the most important assignments for the GFSU were traffic control, phalanx escort, medical support, transportation and small construction. The Commander of the GFSU is Brigadier General Zoukas Ioannis.

Second, Greece contributes to KFOR with Commander Colonel Nikolaos Vitos GR, Army and the rest of the necessary personnel for the COMM ZONE SOUTH. It is located in the Northern Greek town of Thessaloniki.

Third, there are other contingents located in Thessaloniki and Volos, two of the main Greek ports. The mission of these contingents is to support KFOR. When KFOR was created, the main portion of the force moved to Kosovo through the ports of Thessaloniki and Volos. Today, the largest number of spare parts and materials for KFOR continues to pass through these ports.

Finally, a large number of Greek Staff officers operate in KFOR's Headquarters in Pristina (Kosovo), Scopje (FYROM), Durrës (Albania) and Thessaloniki (Greece).<sup>75</sup>

Figures 4, 5, and 6 shows the region of the Multinational Brigades, the location of COMMZ WEST (Durrës) and the location of the COMMZ SOUTH (Thessaloniki) respectively.

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<sup>74</sup> Greek Force Support Unit, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/gfsu.htm>.

<sup>75</sup> ΛΕΥΚΗ ΒΙΒΛΟΣ ΓΙΑ ΤΙΣ ΕΝΟΠΛΕΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΣ 1988-1999 ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟ ΕΘΝΙΚΗΣ ΑΜΥΝΑΣ ΑΘΗΝΑ 2000 p. 58.





Figure 4. Multinational Brigades (MNB) Boundaries and MCO's. (From: Mine Action Coordination Centre, Reports and Documents. Available on line: [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/macc/downloads/organization\\_location.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/macc/downloads/organization_location.pdf)).



Figure 5. Communication Zone West. (From: NATO KFOR COMMZ WEST. Available on line: [http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz\\_west.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz_west.htm))



Figure 6. Communication Zone South. (From: NATO KFOR COMMZ SOUTH.  
Available on line: [http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz\\_south.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz_south.htm))

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## V. GREECE'S POST-KOSOVO CONFLICT FOREIGN POLICY

### A. STABILITY IN THE BALKANS

The Balkans have been considered in recent history to be one of the unstable regions of Europe. In the past decade, political processes in the Balkans have been determined by factors such as the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991. The disintegration of Yugoslavia created five different countries. These countries are Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro). The provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo are included in Serbia. See Figure 7.



Figure 7. Former Yugoslav Republic. (From The New York Times. Available on line: <http://www.pixelpress.org/bosnia/context/balkans-political.GIF.html>)

The countries that are physically located in the Balkan region are Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM),

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey (European Part), Hungary and Moldova. See Figure 8.



Figure 8. The Balkans Regional Atlas. From the Central Intelligence Agency.  
Available on line: (<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/balkan/regter.html>)

Even though these countries appear to form a unique region, they are regarded as separate. In these countries, there are numerous national minorities, which compound a typical separation between religions, cultures and political identities. See Table 1.

<u>Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Southeastern Europe</u>	
	<i>Minorities as % of population</i>
Yugoslavia (new)	Albanian 17%, Hungarian 4%, Muslim 2%
Croatia	Serb 12%, Muslim 1%, Slovene 1%
Slovenia	Croat 3%, Serb 2%, Muslim 1%
FYROM	Albanian 22%, Turkish 4%, Romany 3%, Serb 2%
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serb 40%, Muslim 38%, Croat 22% (break up of entire population. There is no mainstream majority in Bosnia)
Romania	Hungarian 9%
Bulgaria	Turkish 9%, Romany 3%, Slavic Macedonian 3%
Albania	Greek Orthodox 20%, Catholic 10%, Greek 3-8%
Greece	Muslim 1%

Table 1. Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Southeastern Europe Military Balance. (From National Institute for Strategic Studies. London 1996)

More specifically in Kosovo, the large ethnic minorities are Albanians, Croats, Serbs and Montenegrins (Mertus, 1999).<sup>76</sup> As a general rule, the appearance of territorial claims by ethnic minorities in the region leads to conflicts. The Kosovo conflict in 1999 was the last one with campaigns for territorial acquisitions, massive deportation and ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, this new geopolitical situation in the Balkans shows that the focus of international security is under way on the periphery of Europe (White Bible, 2000)<sup>77</sup>.

The Balkans have always been on the agenda of Greek foreign policy. The first meeting of Balkan cooperation took place in Athens in 1976 upon Greece's initiative.

<sup>76</sup> Julie A. Mertus. Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War. University of California Press, Ltd. London England 1999, p. 21.

<sup>77</sup>Greek Ministry of Defense. Lefki Biblos. Ypourgio Ethikis Aminas, Athens 2000, p. 26.



(White Bible, 2000)<sup>78</sup>. Greece as a Balkan country has been affected by these latest evolutions. The war in Kosovo especially had a major impact on Greece's security. The security definition includes military considerations, protection of human rights, promotion of democratic reforms and free economic markets (MFA, 2000)<sup>79</sup>. Additionally, renewed unrest in the Balkans would have a direct affect on Greek security and mostly on its geopolitical position. This geopolitical position is confirmed by its physical position in the Balkan region that connects Europe, Asia and Africa. The importance of Greece's position led NATO officials to choose the port city of Thessaloniki as the location for NATO's KFOR Communication zone south (NATO, 2002).<sup>80</sup> Greece possesses social and political stability as well as economic development. Furthermore, it has the ability to contribute to the solution of regional problems by safeguarding its national interests. It is the only Balkan country which is a member of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is also a member of the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU). Incorporation in these institutions enhance Greece's role as a factor for stability in the Balkans. On 11 December 1999, the European Council in Helsinki confirmed that an efficient and credible enlargement process must be sustained for the stability and prosperity of the entire European continent (EC HELSINKI, 1999).<sup>81</sup> Greece aligned with this new European Council approach for enlargement and its efforts are focused on controlling potential sources of conflict and creating the conditions for political and economic development in the Balkan region. Greece as a member of the European Union wants to share the values and objectives of this treaty with its neighboring Balkan countries. Such efforts can assist its neighbors in the preparation for integration in the European Union.

In order for Greece to facilitate security, it works with its neighboring countries for regional stability by implementing its foreign policy. In terms of the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, Greece's approach to Balkan stability is "A

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<sup>78</sup> Greek Ministry of Defense. Lefki Biblos. Ypourgio Ethikis Aminas, Athens 2000, p. 13.

<sup>79</sup> Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available on line, <http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/a3en.htm>.

<sup>80</sup> Communication Zone (South), Available on line, [http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz\\_south.htm](http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/commz_south.htm).

<sup>81</sup> European Council Helsinki. Available on line, [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/news/12\\_99/doc\\_99\\_16.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/12_99/doc_99_16.htm).



Total Balkan Approach” (MFA, 2002)<sup>82</sup>. The essence of this approach is to collaborate with the other Balkan countries in order to achieve the desired outcome of stability and security. Traditionally, Balkan relations used to be confrontational because it was difficult to set goals and achieve a consensus. Today, the Greek approach has changed and a communication channel has been achieved between potential countries and organizations (stakeholders). Issues are framed in order for a transaction process to occur.

Greece, in order to cope with the post-Kosovo Balkan environmental turbulence and force stability in the region, takes its neighboring countries into account. These major potential stakeholders for Greece’s foreign stability policy are the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Figure 9 illustrates the list of major stakeholders related to Greece’s post-Kosovo conflict foreign policy for stability in the Balkans.




Figure 9. Major Stakeholders Map for Post-Kosovo Greek Foreign Policy.

<sup>82</sup>Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Total Balkan Approach. Available on line, <http://www.greece.gr/POLITICS/South East Europe/TotalBalkanApproach.stm>.

Greece implemented this approach because it seeks to provide a crucial link in the formulation of its stability policy and the actual mobilization of support for this policy. Namely, Greece is assessing the impact of countries or institutions on engaging, utilizing and sustaining support while minimizing or neutralizing political opposition. In order for Greece to implement its stability policy, its major stakeholders have been identified and the aim is to try to organize and mobilize efforts, define and identify opportunities, obstacles and strategies which can then be evaluated in terms of their impact and outcomes. The goal is the construction of a good “fit” between Greece’s implementation of a stability policy and the external environment of the Balkans.

Greece, in order to implement successfully its foreign policy of stability in the Balkan region, supports the establishment of good relations among all Balkan countries. For that reason, Greece participates in international missions in the Former Yugoslavia such as the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) present in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Montenegro and Kosovo) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia Herzegovina, the European Union Administration in Mostar (Herzegovina), the International Police Task Force (ITPF) in Bosnia, and the Western European Union Mostar Police Force WEU (Mostar Police Force) (MFA, 2002)<sup>83</sup>. Greece also participates in the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. This organization began on 10 June 1999 in Cologne and its mission is to apply a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy in Southeastern Europe (STABILITY PACT, 2002)<sup>84</sup>.

The following pages present Greece’s relations with the major stakeholders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

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<sup>83</sup>Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Greece and the Balkans. Available on line, [http://222.mrq.t4/ro43itn/gqlkqn\\_affairs.htm](http://222.mrq.t4/ro43itn/gqlkqn_affairs.htm).

<sup>84</sup> Stability Pact. Available on line [http://www.stabilitypact.org/stabilitypactcgi/catalog/cat\\_descr.cgi?prod\\_id=1806](http://www.stabilitypact.org/stabilitypactcgi/catalog/cat_descr.cgi?prod_id=1806).

## **B. GREECE'S FOREIGN STABILITY POLICY FOR RELATIONS WITH MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS**

### **1. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia**

Greece has traditionally had good relations with Yugoslavia and especially with the Serbs because of the same religion and the common fight against the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars. During World War II, the Serbs opposed the Axis powers as did Greece. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, Greece had good relations with the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Greek government recognized the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a country on 25 April 1996 (MFA, 2002).<sup>85</sup> This country consisted of two republics (Serbia, Montenegro) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo, Vojvodina). The capital is Belgrade (Serbia). The type of government is a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and its constitution was initiated on 27 April 1992 (FRY, 2002).<sup>86</sup>

Greece as a democratic country supports the internationally recognized principle of the inviolability of borders with full respect for the human rights of ethnic communities and the peaceful resolution of differences. For this reason, from the early stages of the Kosovo conflict, Greece supported an accepted solution by all parties with respect to international law and human rights as well as the rights of Kosovo minorities (Albanians, Serbs). Greece always believed in political dialogue. As a Balkan country and a member of both NATO and the EU, Greece decided not to participate in the operation "Allied Force" against Serbia on 24 May 1999. As Greek Prime Minister Mr. Kostas Simitis said in his political party's new central committee on 29 March 1999, Greece did not believe that solutions to the Kosovo conflict could be found outside the political and diplomatic field. Also, the military operations could change the borders in the Balkan region which is against the internationally recognized principle of the inviolability of borders. Furthermore, more reasons for Greek non-participation in the military NATO campaign were the friendships between Greece and Serbia, the new war refugees and the economic consequences of the war. The results of the war would have

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<sup>85</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Balkans. Available on line, <http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/a3en.htm>.

<sup>86</sup> Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Introduction. Available on line, <http://www.gov.yu/start.asp?je=E>.

been the destruction of the Kosovo infrastructure, and moreover, the destabilization of the region. (GREEK EMBASSY USA, 1999).<sup>87</sup>

During the conflict in Kosovo, Greece with Switzerland, the Russian Federation and Austria launched a humanitarian initiative called “Operation FOCUS” on 28 April 1999. The purpose of this operation was to assist all victims of the crisis in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Greece contributed a large number of envoys and humanitarian officers to FRY to coordinate the distribution of supplies. The NATO Summit in Washington D.C. in April 1999 praised the Greek officer’s humanitarian efforts to bring humanitarian assistance to the most displaced Albanian population which was hiding in the mountains (MFA, 2002)<sup>88</sup>. After the end of the conflict in Kosovo, Greek participation in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) with a brigade as well as the constant humanitarian help and medical supplies to Serbia, played an influential role both in the humanitarian sector as well as in the reconstruction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the future.

Even though Greece did not participate in the NATO military campaign, it did not oppose NATO military intervention and allowed the port of Thessaloniki to be used for the passage of NATO troops and supplies to the peacekeeping force (FBIS, 1999)<sup>89</sup>. This occurred because even though Greece did not agree that war was the best solution instead of diplomacy, it sustained its ties to the organizations to which it belongs. Greece is concerned with the secession claims of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and fully supports the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Greek armed forces were in a state of alert because of the crisis in Kosovo, though not from a fear of war, but mainly for the preparation of military camps to accommodate refugees from Kosovo (HR-NET, 2002).<sup>90</sup> Greece responded successively to all the humanitarian calls received. Thus, Greece always tried to reach increased military readiness in its humanitarian assistance.

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<sup>87</sup> Embassy of Greece in USA. Press office. Available on line  
<http://www.greekembassy.org/press/newsflash/1999/March/nflash0330.html>.

<sup>88</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Greece Now. Available on line,  
<http://www.greece.gr/POLITICS/SouthEastEurope/OperationFOCUS.stm>.

<sup>89</sup> I Kathimerini (Greek Newspaper). Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Available on line,  
<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS20149.pdf>.

<sup>90</sup> Hellenic Resources Radio. Greece Preparing for Wave of Refugees from Kosovo. Available on line,  
<http://www.hri.org/news/greek/eraen/1999/99-03-24.eraen.html>.

In the September 2000 elections, Vojislav Kostunica defeated Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. As long as Milosevic was in power, there were objective limits to the development of a comprehensive policy toward the Balkans because of his strict political regime. The new Yugoslavian Presidential election pointed towards a new era for Yugoslavia. On 7 October 2000, the Greek Foreign Minister George Panandreu visited Belgrade as the first European Union minister to meet with President Kostunica. This visit was the initiation of a procedure for Yugoslavia to be converted into a member of the international community. (ERA, 2000)<sup>91</sup> President Kostunica showed his appreciation to Greece for the help it offered to Yugoslavia and called for Greece's support in the Yugoslavian effort to become once again a member of the European family. He noted that Greece as a Balkan country as well as a EU member was the only path to the external world for Yugoslavia. (ERA, 2000)<sup>92</sup> On 21 October 2000, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic visited Greece. In the meantime, Greece sent 32 buses to Yugoslavia to be used as public transportation in the capital of Belgrade (ERA, 2000)<sup>93</sup> On 16 January 2001, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica visited Greece. He had a meeting with the Greek President Costis Stefanopoulos, the Prime Minister Costas Simitis and other Greek politicians. Greek support for the Yugoslav economy during its transition period was also confirmed. In addition, Greece indicated that it was ready to help Yugoslavia rebuild its infrastructure. Both sides concluded that Greece and Yugoslavia faced a new period of relations focusing on economic cooperation.

President Kostunica agreed to enhance Balkan cooperation and to do everything possible to deal with the problem caused by the depleted uranium ammunition used in military operations. (FRY FMFA, 2001)<sup>94</sup>. On January 10 2001, the Council of Europe issued a report referring to the environmental impact of the war in Yugoslavia on

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<sup>91</sup> The Hellenic Radio (ERA) Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpab/2000/00-10-07.mpab.html#01>.

<sup>92</sup> The Hellenic Radio (ERA) Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpab/2000/00-10-07.mpab.html#10>.

<sup>93</sup> The Hellenic Radio (ERA) Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/eraen/2000/00-11-21.eraen.html#08>.

<sup>94</sup> Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available on line: [http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Policy/bilateral/en/160101\\_e.html](http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Policy/bilateral/en/160101_e.html).

Southeastern Europe. According to this report, the environmental damage caused by the war in Yugoslavia resulted from the use of depleted uranium, the consequences of the extensive use of aircraft, water and air contamination, direct damage to forests and soils, and finally the environmental effects of population displacement. According to official information, concerning the use of depleted uranium specifically, about 31,000 warheads were used which constituted a total load of ten tons of depleted uranium. It is difficult if not impossible to recover elements of depleted uranium from the environment or to neutralize them. The biological accumulation of uranium has an effect on the population in the affected areas and can lead to permanent health problems (COE, 2001).<sup>95</sup>

Greece strengthened its geographical position and through traditional ties with the people of the Balkans sustained the efforts of Yugoslavia to overcome its crisis. On 17 November 2000, Greece sent an emergency humanitarian shipment of food of 1,100 tons of chicken meat and four million eggs to Belgrade. As reconstruction and development assistance, Greece financial help to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia includes \$15 million out of the total of a \$100 million loan from Greece to Yugoslavia. Greece has also secured \$250 million to be distributed until 2005 to be used for traffic, communications, health and education (FRY EMBASSY, 2001).<sup>96</sup>

A stable democratic Kosovo is the most important issue for stability in the Balkans. UNMIK and KFOR have contributed much to the restoration of Kosovo but the situation in Kosovo is far from settled and will require long-term efforts by the international community. The most intimidating challenge for UNMIK and KFOR is to maintain security in Kosovo. After the end of NATO air strikes, Yugoslav military forces returned to Kosovo. The return of Yugoslav military forces to Kosovo as well as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) within Kosovo did not result in any violence under the auspices of UNMIK and KFOR. However, as the number of refugees returning to Kosovo increased, the Serb minority in Kosovo became the target of ethnic violence mostly from KLA members. The situation in Kosovo today remains worrisome. The economy is in disarray. However, the task of building a strong and viable indigenous

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<sup>95</sup> Council of Europe. Environmental Impact of the War in Yugoslavia on South-East Europe. Available on line, <http://stars.coe.fr/doc/doc01/EDO8925.htm>.

<sup>96</sup> Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Embassy. Available on line, <http://www.twics.com/~embtokyo/HOMEPAGE/j33.htm>.

economy, which would be linked to regional and European markets, is certainly a long-term challenge. Furthermore, lawlessness and the lack of security persist in many places and there is still no trust between Serbian and Albanian communities. Despite the presence of KFOR troops there are still some areas in which public order has not yet been restored. As long as the international community does not encourage a stable political situation in Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR will not likely be able to bring long-term peace to Kosovo.

## **2. Albania**

The Albanian state was formally recognized on 30 May 1913 by the Treaty of London (Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy) but created its current borders in 1926. Albania followed the Soviet economic model after World War II. Its leadership was under the communist regime of Enver Hoxha (VICKERS, 1999).<sup>97</sup> In 1978, Albania decided to follow a more independent policy, because under its communistic regime, it had been isolated from the rest of the world for a long time. Ramiz Alia, Hoxha's successor, initiated small reforms in 1985 (Chopani, 1997).<sup>98</sup>

Sali Berisha was elected in the 1992 elections to the Albanian Presidency. These elections saw the collapse of the one-party state in Albania and the first democratically elected regime to come to power. President Berisha launched a courageous economic program to enhance the Albanian economy, which was in dire straits, based mainly on external loans. Simultaneously, Berisha announced that his party would not stop fighting until its great dream of uniting the Albania nation came true (VICKERS, 1999).<sup>99</sup> This was the issue of Albanian unification. According to this issue, the idea of a "Greater Albania" was the redemption of the Albanian brethren living in Kosovo and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (DANOPOULOS, 1997).<sup>100</sup> The international community urged Berisha that any move towards changing the existing borders to create

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<sup>97</sup> Miranda Vickers *Between Serb and Albanian*, Columbia University press, New York, 1998, p. 81, p. 137.

<sup>98</sup> Constantin P. Danopoulos and Adem Chopani. *Albanian Nationalism and Prospects for Greater Albania Crises in the Balkans*, C. Danopoulos, K. Messas. Westview 1997, p. 177.

<sup>99</sup> Miranda Vickers *Between Serb and Albanian*, Columbia University press, New York, 1998, p. 81, p. 256.

<sup>100</sup> Constantin P. Danopoulos and Adem Chopani. *Albanian Nationalism and Prospects for Greater Albania Crises in the Balkans*, C. Danopoulos, K. Messas. Westview 1997, p. 172.

a unified Albania would cause a bloodbath and Albania would lose all its foreign economic assistance (VICKERS, 1999).<sup>101</sup> Thus, Albania even though it wanted to achieve the unification of all Albanians of the Balkan region, did not have the potential economic and military resources to do so. In the last several years, the Albanian government has explicitly rejected the idea of a “Greater Albania” and has emphasized instead the need to make borders more open and porous.

The relations between Greece and Albania have been uneasy throughout history and sometimes hostile. The center of the dispute is a piece of land the size of Delaware. This territory is located northwest of Epirus in the northern part of Greece and south of Tirana in the southern part of Albania. Albanians see it as the southern part of their country and Greeks refer to it as Northern Epirus (DANOPOULOS, 1997).<sup>102</sup> Greece became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1830. After its independence, there were Orthodox and Greek speaking people living in the above area. This Greek minority suffered much during the communist regime of Enver Hoxha (1908-1985). During that time many Greeks were dispersed around Albania and forced to hide their identity and culture. Later in 1994, under Berisha’s leadership, five members of the Greek minority political party in Albania were accused of and sentenced for secessionist activities. The accused were released under international pressure in February 1995 by initiating a new era of diplomatic relations between Albania and Greece (DANOPOULOS, 1997).<sup>103</sup>

The collapse of the Soviet Union drastically affected the political and economic system in Albania. In 1991, Greece started to receive an influx of both legal and illegal Albanian immigrants as a result of an economic crisis in Albania. Since then, Albanian immigrants are estimated to be at least 250,000 in 1996 but according to other estimates, this number may have been as high as 500,000. (GREEK MOP, 2002)<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Miranda Vickers *Between Serb and Albanian*, Columbia University press, New York, 1998, p. 81, p. 269.

<sup>102</sup> Constantine P. Danopoulos and Adem Chopani. *Albanian Nationalism and Prospects for Greater Albania Crises in the Balkans*, C. Danopoulos, K. Messas. Westview 1997, p. 182.

<sup>103</sup> Constantine P. Danopoulos and Adem Chopani. *Albanian Nationalism and Prospects for Greater Albania Crises in the Balkans*, C. Danopoulos, K. Messas. Westview 1997, pp. 182-186.

<sup>104</sup> Greek Ministry of Press. *Bilateral Relations*. Available on line, <http://www.greekembassy.org/wgreece/212.html>



Greece pursues the development of good relations and cooperation with Albania. These relations are based on the respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity, national independence and the respect of human rights including national minorities rights (MFA, 2002).<sup>105</sup> Good relations began on 21-22 March 1996. The Greek President Kostas Stephanopoulos visited Albania and the two countries signed an agreement of friendship and cooperation. The Greek president characterized the agreement as a “landmark in Greek-Albanian relations” (DANOPOULOS, 1997).<sup>106</sup> At the beginning of 1997, Albania was plunged into chaos with the collapse of “pyramid” economic investment schemes. The ruling Democratic Party, under the leadership of President Sali Berisha, was widely blamed for this and the ensuing breakdown in law and order. The uprising led to the theft of approximately 600,000 firearms from the Albanian barracks by the Albanian people (ZHELYAZKOVA, 2000).<sup>107</sup> Following this unrest, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1101 on 28 March 1997 for the organization and deployment in Albania of a Multinational Force. Greece sent a Hellenic Force to Albania consisting of 803 men and 224 vehicles. On 16 April 1997, the Hellenic Force was deployed to the areas of Tirana, Avlon and Elbasan. The mission of this force was to secure the reception and distribution of humanitarian aid as well as to guarantee the smooth electoral procedures in Albania during 1997. The withdrawal of the Hellenic Force was completed on 3 August 1997. 205 men of the Hellenic Force remained in Albania in order to assist the Albanian forces in the reorganization and protection of the construction of the Military Hospital of Tirana built with Greek funds (MOP, 20002)<sup>108</sup>.

Greece’s Armed Forces contribute to the Albanian Armed Forces with a cooperation project started in 1992. Since that time, many agreements have been signed during 1992-2002 for specific military matters related to military assistance, reconstruction, education, medical support and defense. Greece has donated \$1.2 million

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<sup>105</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs Greece and the Balkans. Available on line, [http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/balkan\\_affairs.htm](http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/balkan_affairs.htm).

<sup>106</sup> Constantin P. Danopoulos and Adem Chopani. *Albanian Nationalism and Prospects for Greater Albania Crises in the Balkans*, C. Danopoulos, K. Messas. Westview, 1997, p. 187.

<sup>107</sup> International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, *The Three Albanian Communities and their Prospects Six Months Later*, Available on line, [http://www.omda.bg/imir/studies/alb\\_comm2.html](http://www.omda.bg/imir/studies/alb_comm2.html).

<sup>108</sup> Greek Ministry of Press. *Greece and Multilateral Diplomacy*. Available on line, <http://www.greekembassy.org/wgreece/greece/311.html>.

for the modernization of the Tirana military hospital. Greece has provided and still provides assistance to Albania in a variety of fields. The most important fields are:

- Organization-Equipment-Training of two NATO structure Infantry Brigades at Avlona in Tirana some of which has been delivered, while the personnel meant to staff the Brigades are still being trained by the Greek Military stationed in Albania
- Organization of a logistic support Base at Berati by providing means, material and know-how to assist in the organization of the base
- The operation of Recruit Training Center by providing equipment and rebuilding the facilities of the camp at Mzes where the center will be located
- The organization of the Naval base at Durres and St. Saranta by allocating means, equipment and know-how by experts of the Hellenic Navy
- The refloating of sunken ships of the Albanian Navy at St. Saranta by providing equipment and personnel
- The maintenance of the Albanian Beacon Network by installing lights, laying buoys and repairing beacons
- The training of Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) which took place at appropriate facilities in Greece while material and equipment has been allocated for the U.D.T. of the Albanian Armed Forces
- The reorganization of Rinas airport with material, means and know-how to be provided by the Air Force
- The organization of the military hospital at Argirokastro by providing material and technical assistance.
- The imparting of grants to Albanian military people to attend the Military Academies and NCOs Schools of Greece, such as the Military Academy, the Corps officers Military School and the Nursing officers Schools (HRI, 1998)<sup>109</sup>

Furthermore, after the Kosovo crisis, NATO in the framework of the Allied Plan “Allied Harbor” in Albania initiated the operation “Albanian Force”. The deployed force was 5,700 troops from countries that belong to the Partnership For Peace (PFP) NATO program. The mission of the Albanian Force (AFOR), from 16 April to 1 September 1999 was to provide humanitarian assistance in support of, and in close cooperation with, the Albanian civil and military authorities, the United Nations and other non-governmental organizations in the field. On 8 April 1999, Greece contributed to AFOR with one

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<sup>109</sup> Hellenic National Defence General Staff. Contribution of the Hellenic Armed Forces to the Albanian Armed Forces. Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/mod/english/military/helarmfal.htm>.

Infantry Company, one Engineers Company, one Supply and Transportation Company and one Chinook helicopter. The main task of the Greek Force participating in AFOR was the provision of water and the operation of the following three refugee camps:

- Camp "ATHENA" in Kukes with 100 tents and the capacity to shelter 1000 refugees. The camp was first opened and operated in the period 20-28 April 1999 and then it was handed over to the Albanian Ministry of Defense where its supply from Greece continued until the end of May 1999
- Camp "OLYMPIA" in Tirana with 200 huts and the capacity to shelter 2000 refugees. The camp was opened and operated in the period 20 April - 14 July 1999 when it was handed over to the Albanian MOD.
- Camp "VERGINA" in Pogradets with 200 tents and the capacity to shelter 2000 refugees. The camp operated until 03 July 1999 when it was handed over to the Albanian MOD

The Greek Force remained in Albania until 13 August 1999 and AFOR transformed it into one of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) communication zones (COMMZ WEST). From 1 September 1999 a part of the Greek Force belonged to AFOR and was transformed and contributed to COMMZ (WEST). The Greek contribution to COMMZ (WEST) consists of one Infantry Company with an Engineer's complement of a total strength of 60 persons (MOD, 2002).<sup>110</sup>

On 15 October 1997, the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis visited Albania. The two governments signed an agreement for the opening of three new border crossings. The Greek Prime Minister stressed that his visit to Albania symbolized the two countries' purpose to move ahead towards smooth relations. The Albanian press reported that the visit of the Greek Prime Minister was to promote bilateral cooperation (HR-NET, 1997).<sup>111</sup> On 12 March 1988, the Albanian President Rexhep Mejdani visited Greece for three days. During his visit, an agreement to protect the Greek-Albanian sea frontier was signed. Furthermore, a protocol for economic cooperation was signed in which Greece gave approximately \$5.3 million (EURO 6 million) to the Albanian budget as well as approximately \$48 million (EURO 56 million) in credit for developmental projects. In the period 1997 – 1999, Greece presented Albania \$208 million to finance a great number

<sup>110</sup> Greek Ministry of Defence. Hellenic Peace Support Missions. Available on line, [http://www.mod.gr/FYLLADIA/white\\_bibile\\_2k/k3\\_3.htm](http://www.mod.gr/FYLLADIA/white_bibile_2k/k3_3.htm).

<sup>111</sup> Hellenic Resources Network. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpab/1997/97-10-15.mpab.html>.

of infrastructures. These infrastructures involve electricity, the water supply, transport, education and health services. On 25 January 2002, the Albanian Prime Minister Ilir Meta visited Greece. In this meeting, the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis mentioned that Greece supplied Albania with 100 megawatts during bad weather in the Balkans last December in 2001. They also agreed that meetings should be held to utilize the waters of Albanian AooRiver (HR-NET, 2002).<sup>112</sup>

In the past few years, thousands of Albanian patients have been treated in Greek hospitals free of charge. In the period 1990 – 1995, more than 40,000 Albanian patients had been treated in the Ioannina Hospital in northern Greece) (MOP, 20002)<sup>113</sup>

Another major contribution to Albania's economy is the Greek private sector's investment in Albania. According to the Financial Times, telecommunications and banking have emerged as the main sectors of Greek investment but energy, food processing and retailing are also important. Hellenic Petroleum has started its network for oil products in Albania. The Greek Alpha Bank has also invested \$15 million to launch its network in Albania (TIMES, 1999).<sup>114</sup>

The approximately 300,000 legal or illegal Albanian immigrants who live in Greece sent a large amount of money back to Albania. The estimated remittances sent by immigrants to Albania amounted to more than \$400 million per year (MFA, 2002).<sup>115</sup> The Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis noted that the issue of the Albanian immigrant's social security coverage is still open for discussion. Furthermore, consultations are underway between the responsible authorities in Greece and Albania to find a better solution to the immigrant's social security coverage (HR-NET, 2002).<sup>116</sup> By the end of April 1999, after the beginning of NATO air strikes, about 600,000 residents

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<sup>112</sup> Hellenic Resources Network. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available on line, [www.hri.org/news/greek/mpab/2002/02-01-25.mpab.html](http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpab/2002/02-01-25.mpab.html).

<sup>113</sup> Greek Ministry of Press. Bilateral Relations. Available on line, <http://www.greekembassy.org/wgreece/greece/212.html>.

<sup>114</sup> Financial Times Balkan Investment: Positioned to Rebuild a Better Region. Available on line, <http://specials.ft.com/ln/fts-surveys/country/scb436.htm>.

<sup>115</sup> Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available on line, <http://www.greekembassy.org/wgreece/greece/212.html>.

<sup>116</sup> Hellenic Resources Network. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpab/2002/02-01-25.mpab.html>.

of Kosovo had become refugees. Another 400,000 were internally displaced in Kosovo. Albania received about 375,000 refugees and FYROM received about 200,000 refugees (MIGRATION NEWS, 1999).<sup>117</sup> The EU governments wanted to keep refugees as close to Kosovo as possible because they believed that the further they were from their homes, the more difficult it would be for them to return to their country. Even though Greece aligned with the EU mandate on its refugee policy, it offered to shelter 6,000 refugees if necessary. Greece, by having experienced approximately 300,000 Albanian immigrants on its territory since 1990, was worried about the Kosovo refugee situation. All those thousands of ethnic Albanians that arrived in FYROM and Albania threatened the economy and political stability of these countries. Greece has faced the same problem for more than a decade with Albanian immigrants. Greece's concern was primarily to prevent refugees from settling in the southern part of Albania where the Greek minority resides. For this reason, Greece took humanitarian action by sending humanitarian assistance to Albania's capital of Tirana where the majority of the refugees had fled.

Immigration, legal or illegal, plays a considerable role in the crisis in the Balkans. Immigration as a refugee flow impacts the host country. As discussed previously, Albania and FYROM hosted 375,000 and 200,000 refugees, respectively. In the case of Albania, the influx of refugees is an economic and social problem. The Kosovar Albanians refugees are the same religion and no ethnic differences exist among the Albanian citizens. As a result, the Albanian economy is strained, and the infrastructure networks and the social institutions are weak (USAID, 2002).<sup>118</sup> Furthermore, the weak public and civil society institutions, fragile government authority, organized crime and corruption weakened them even more. In the case of FYROM, the Kosovar Albanian refugees who entered the country accounted for approximately 10 percent of the entire FYROM population. These refugees mixed with FYROM's local Albanian residents that constitute approximately 23 percent of the population (COUNTRY WATCH, 2000)<sup>119</sup>. This large Albanian minority inside FYROM has led to a deterioration in Albanian inter-ethnic

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<sup>117</sup> Migration News.Kosovar Refugees. Available on line, [http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive\\_mn/may\\_1999-09mn.html](http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive_mn/may_1999-09mn.html).

<sup>118</sup> The United States Agency of International Development. Available on line, <http://www.usaid.gov/>.

<sup>119</sup> Country Watch. FYROM. Available on line, [www.countrywatch.com/cw\\_country.asp](http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_country.asp).

relations with FYROM. Moreover, FYROM has to face the economic consequences of the large number of refugees that exceeds the country's economic capacity.

In the Balkan region, two routes seem to have replaced the former traditional route disrupted by the Yugoslavian conflict. One northern route runs mainly through Bulgaria, then Romania and Hungary and one southern route runs from Bulgaria through FYROM, the Kosovo region and Albania.

It is difficult to predict the further development of Albanian organized crime. Future threats are realistic given the brutality and lack of ethics displayed by Albanian crime groups, the international links which already exist, the professionalism which characterizes most of their activities and the strong ties created by ethnic Albanian origins. Moreover, the strong position of Albanian crime groups in Kosovo, FYROM and Albania itself, is definitely a cause for concern in the international community, especially when the geo-political instability in the region and the presence of a UN peacekeeping force are taken into account.

The other side of the immigration problem is its impacts on a wealthy neighboring country in which the immigrants are looking for a better future. This is actually the case of Albanian immigrants who come to Greece. These mostly illegal immigrants affected Greece's economy and society. On 27 March 1998, Albanian President Redjep Meidani visited Greece. In his statement commenting on the issue of the increased crime rate in Greece that is being attributed to illegal Albanian immigrants, he noted that the problems of organized crime, smuggling and illegal immigration can be dealt with through cooperation between Greece and Albania (HR-NET, 2002).<sup>120</sup> The groups which have invested capital in illegal immigration tend to view immigration in economic terms as principally an increase in the supply of low-wage workers in Greece. Albanian workers receive lower wages and often do not have social security which leads to lower production costs and has a positive effect on the competitiveness of Greek exports.

On the other hand, the majority of Albanian families have been dependent on remittances for their survival. Remittances for the year 1991 have been estimated at USD

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<sup>120</sup> Hellenic Resources Network. Macedonia Press Agency. Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpa/1998/98-03-27.mpa.html>.

548.5 million and at USD 364 million for the year 1992. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, on 23 May 2001, noted that over 20 percent of the GDP of Albania comes from these remittances (MOA, 2001)<sup>121</sup>. The Greek workers view immigration as a threat because in many cases the low salaries paid to Albanian immigrants have displaced Greek workers, especially in the industrial sector, construction and quarries. Furthermore, Greek public opinion concerning the Albanian immigrants is negative. Eighty five percent of the Greek population agreed that since Greece has reached its limits, there would be more problems if more immigrants arrived. (EUROBAROMETER, 1997).<sup>122</sup>

Greece also has been affected by the flourishing of organized crime in drugs and arms trafficking in neighboring Albania. Drug trafficking, in particular, has developed at an alarming rate in the last ten years across the entire region of Russia, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. Throughout Europe, around 40 percent of the heroin trade seems to be controlled by Albanians. Recent refugees from the Kosovo region are involved in street sales. Tensions between the established ethnic Albanians and new refugees seem to exist and heroin prices have dropped since their arrival which has resulted in growing competition in the market that caused prices to drop. Albanian cannabis is mainly sold on the Greek market. In order to transport the drugs to Greece, Albanian crime groups work together with Greek criminals. Albanian criminal groups also cooperate with the Italian Mafia and have links to the Middle East that allow them to import a large amount of narcotics into the Balkans (INTERPOL, 2000).<sup>123</sup>

The Albanian Government has increased efforts toward the Greek minority in Albania. The Greek minority now stands as a bridge between the two countries. The Albanian Prime Minister Ilir Meta in his last visit to Athens on 25 January 2002 noted Greece's sensitivity regarding the ethnic Greek minority in southern Albania. He also noticed that good relations between Athens and Tirana demands satisfactory living

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<sup>121</sup> Greek Embassy in USA. Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs. Shaping Policies for the Challenges. Available on line, [http://www.greekembassy.org/news/shaping\\_policy\\_for\\_the\\_challenge.html](http://www.greekembassy.org/news/shaping_policy_for_the_challenge.html).

<sup>122</sup> Eurobarometer Opinion Poll. Racism and Xenophobia in Europe. Available on line, [http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb/racism/racism\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb/racism/racism_en.pdf).

<sup>123</sup> Interpol. The Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organized Crime Drugs and Terrorist, Available on line, <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/muts1213.htm>.

conditions and respect for the rights of the Greek Orthodox in Albania (HR-NET, 2002)<sup>124</sup>

Furthermore, Greece has been defined as the Leading Nation for association with international organizations in Albania which provides special prestige and importance to the effort made by Greece to assist in the restructuring of the Albanian Armed Forces, economy, and enhancing cooperation between the two countries. Greece is the only European Union (EU) country that has common borders with Albania. Greece's goal is to continue to help Albania to be democratic, economically prosperous and politically stable. This will decrease Albanian nationalism, increase the rights of the Greek minority in Albania and finally will control the refugee flow across the borders. Therefore, Greece should keep helping Albania with its public and private sectors (MFA, 2002).<sup>125</sup>

### **3. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)**

Since ancient times the land of Macedonia was between the states of Greece, Bulgaria and FYROM. Historically, Macedonia as a state existed only twice. The first time was during the reign of Philip II from 359 to 336 BC and his son, Alexander the Great, from 336 to 323 BC. The next time was 1991 when FYROM declared its separation from federal Yugoslavia (MERTUS, 1999).<sup>126</sup> After the reign of the Macedonian Kings, Macedonia was under the rule of the Romans, the Byzantines, the Bulgarians, the Serbians, the Ottoman Empire and the state of Yugoslavia (TREADWAY, 1997)<sup>127</sup>. In November 1945, Tito established Yugoslavia as a Federal Republic. The Federation consisted of six equal republics. These republics were Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. After Tito's death on 4 May 1980, the Republic of Yugoslavia survived for ten more years. After 1991, in the former Yugoslav republics, the agenda of national self-determination has overridden the agenda of democratization, leading to the disintegration of the Republic of

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<sup>124</sup> Hellenic Resources Network. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available on line, [http://zeus.hri.org/news/greek/apcen/2002/02-01-25\\_1.apcen.html](http://zeus.hri.org/news/greek/apcen/2002/02-01-25_1.apcen.html).

<sup>125</sup> Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Balkans. Available on line, <http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/a3en.htm>.

<sup>126</sup> Jurie A. Mertus. Kosovo: how myths and truths started a war. University of California Press, Ltd. 1999. p. 298.

<sup>127</sup> Constantine P. Danopoulos and Kostas G. Messas: John D. Treadway, Of Shatter Belts and Powder Kegs: A Brief Survey of Yugoslav History. Westview Press, 1997. p. 36.



Yugoslavia. On 17 September 1991, the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared its sovereignty (CIA, 2002).<sup>128</sup> The Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also declared its separation from the Yugoslav Republic and sought international recognition under the name “Republic of Macedonia”. The use of this name caused disputes with Greece because it had to be distinguished from the ancient Greek Macedonia and from the Greek province of Macedonia that is in today’s northern Greece. Furthermore, other disputes with Greece were the use of the star-burst symbol of Alexander the Great, the king of ancient Macedonia, in its flag as well as two articles in its constitution with hidden claims to the Greek province of Macedonia.

On 16 December 1991, the Council of Ministers of the European Community with its Recognition of States Annex-2 adopted the Greek position to recognize the new state of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia if the three conditions about the name, the constitutional articles and the flag were settled. The last specific article was:

The Community and its Member States also require a Yugoslav Republic to commit itself, prior to recognition, to adopt constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims towards a neighbouring Community State and that it will conduct no hostile propaganda activities versus a neighbouring Community State, including the use of a denomination which implies territorial claims (EUROPEAN JOURNAL, 2002)<sup>129</sup>

The Council of the European Community wanted to see improvements in the three conditions in order to recognize the new state of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. With an amendment to its constitution on 6 January 1992, the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia made it clear that it has no any territorial claims towards any neighboring state and that the borders of the country can be changed only by generally accepted international norms (FOSIM, 2001)<sup>130</sup>. Greece was satisfied with this amendment but two more disputes had to be settled.

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<sup>128</sup> Central Intelligent Service. The World Fact Book. Available on line, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html>.

<sup>129</sup> European Journal of International Law. Recognition of States Annex-2. Available on line, <http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol4/No1/art7.html>.

<sup>130</sup> Foundation Open Society Institute Macedonia. Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Available on line, <http://www.soros.org.mk/mk/en/const.htm>.

On 7 April 1993, the United Nations Security Council noting that differences had arisen over the name of the state, which had to be resolved, and without any mention of the flag symbols, welcomed with Resolution 817, the new state with the name of the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) (HR-NET, 2002).<sup>131</sup> FYROM’s recognition came without resolving the disputes over the flag and the name. For that reason, Greece protested and on 16 February 1994, imposed an economic trade embargo and closed the port of Thessaloniki in northern Greece to FYROM’s imports and exports. This mainly occurred to force FYROM’s government to become less intransigent in the United Nations negotiations and to alert foreign governments, which were losing interest, that this was a vital but still unresolved issue (ZAHARIADIS, 1996)<sup>132</sup>. On 13 September 1995, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Karolos Papoulias and the FYROM Minister of Foreign Affairs Stevo Crvenkovski, signed an Interim Accord between the Hellenic Republic and FYROM in New York in the presence of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Cyrus R. Vance. According to this accord, Greece had to recognize FYROM as an independent state, and the two countries had to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of each other as well as the inviolability of the borders. Greece had to establish a liaison office in Skopje, the capital of FYROM. Both countries had to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations in reaching an agreement on the differences described in Resolution 817 of the United Nations Security Council. FYROM had to stop using in any way the symbols of the star-burst in all its forms displayed on its national flag. The two countries shall refrain from imposing any impediment to the movement of people or goods between their territories or through the territory of either country to the territory of the other. Both countries shall cooperate to facilitate such movements in accordance with international law and custom, hence the cessation of the Greek embargo (HR-NET, 2002).<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Hellenic Resources Network. Ministry of Foreign Affairs UN Resolution 817/1993, Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/docs/fyrom/S.RES.817.html>.

<sup>132</sup> Modern Greek Studies. Zahariadis Nikolaos Greek Policy Toward FYROM 1991-1995, p. 313.

<sup>133</sup> Hellenic Resources Network. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. United Nations. Interim Accord Between the Hellenic Republic and the FYROM. Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/docs/fyrom/95-27866.html>.

On 13 October 1995, Greek Ambassador Dimitrios Kypraios and FYROM Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Ljupco Arsovski signed a memorandum on the mutual establishment of liaison offices in Greece and FYROM respectively (HR-NET, 2002).<sup>134</sup> After these initiations, Greece and FYROM have entered a new phase in their relations characterized by the will of both sides to proceed to even closer and mutually beneficially relations. The Greek Government spokesman in February 2001 noted, “The climate between the two countries is very different compared with the past”(MFA, 2002).<sup>135</sup> The only dispute that has to be settled is the final name of FYROM.

However, as the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgios Papandreou in an interview at BBC’s service noted, Greece and FYROM are viewing the issue of the name as friends and not as opponents. The two countries are trying to find a solution respecting both sides’ sensitivity and without any antagonism (MFA, 2002).<sup>136</sup>

The economic relations of the two countries are impressive. As a small economy, FYROM recognizes that the country’s long-term prosperity is closely tied to international trade. Greece is FYROM’s second largest trading partner in the region and the third largest overall after the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Germany with \$186 million total in trade during the first ten months of 1997 (CEEBC, 2002).<sup>137</sup> Greece also is ranked first in FYROM’s investment. Investment includes construction, banking, textiles, foodstuffs, electronics and telecommunications. Tourism, particularly in the Aegean tourist resorts, is rapidly increasing. Also, military cooperation has been increased with the participation of FYROM units in NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises in both countries. The Prime Ministers of the two countries met on 10 May 1999 informally in Thessaloniki Greece at a conference held by the Federation of Northern Greek Industries and focused on the situation in the Balkans a decade after the deregulation of markets. This meeting enhanced the economic and trade links of the two countries. On 29

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<sup>134</sup> Hellenic Resources Network. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Memorandum of the Mutual Establishment of Liaison Offices. Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/docs/fyrom/liaison.html>.

<sup>135</sup> Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. FYROM in Focus. Available on line, <http://www.greece.gr/POLITICS/SouthEastEurope/fyrominfocus.stm>.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Central and Eastern Europe Business Information Center. FYROM: Foreign Trade with Neighboring Countries. Available on line, <http://www.mac.doc.gov/eebic/cables/1998/jan/sko85.htm>.

september 1999, the Greek Olympic Airways initiated their flights from Athens to FYROM (MFA, 2002).<sup>138</sup>

During the Kosovo crisis, Greece supported FYROM politically and economically. Greece undertook a serious effort to alleviate the burden placed on FYROM from the flow of refugees from Kosovo. The number of refugees that arrived in FYROM was about 250,000. In April 1999, Greece approved \$2 million in humanitarian assistance to FYROM. The total sum of Greek humanitarian aid for the refugees who flowed into Albania and FYROM exceeded \$11 million. (MFA, 1999)<sup>139</sup> In the energy sector, the Hellenic Petroleum Ltd. acquired 45 percent of FYROM's OKTA refineries and has already began the construction of a 143 mile pipeline to carry crude oil from the port of Thessaloniki in Greece to Skopje in FYROM. The project will cost \$90 million and will have an annual capacity of 2.5 million tons (MFA, 2002)<sup>140</sup>. Also, the other major Greek investment in FYROM was the acquisition of a 65 percent stake in Stopanska Banka AD, the largest commercial bank in FYROM for DM 117 million.

FYROM has a population of more than two million people. The majority is Christian Slav-Macedonians but the Muslim Albanians account for 22 percent of the population (CIA, 1995)<sup>141</sup>. This Albanian minority in FYROM caused some trouble in 2001. The conflict was centered on the ethnic Albanians and FYROM and their rights. Finally, on 13 August 2001, under a NATO initiative, an agreement was signed by both sides. On 26 August 2001, NATO began operation "Essential Harvest". The mission was to collect arms and ammunition voluntarily turned over by ethnic Albanian rebels, and thereby help to build confidence in the broader peace process suggested by the President of FYROM. Greece contributed to this operation with one infantry battle group.

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<sup>138</sup> Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Balkans. Available on line, <http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/a3en.htm>.

<sup>139</sup> Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Journal of Foreign Policy Issues. Nicos Ziogas. Greek Humanitarian Assistance to the Kosovo Crisis. Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/spring99/humanitarian.html>.

<sup>140</sup> Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Balkans. Available on line, <http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/a3en.htm>.

<sup>141</sup> CIA World Fact Book 1995: FYROM. Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/docs/CIA/FYROM95.html>.

According to this operation, Greece transferred and destroyed all the weapons collected from the Albanian rebels in two phases (NATO, 2001).<sup>142</sup>

Greece and FYROM, despite the name dispute, have found ways in the guise of friendship and cooperation to find common ground. The constant Greek assistance and investment in FYROM as well as the different agreements between the two countries have introduced numerous bilateral contact areas. Greece is the link between FYROM and the European Organizations and can help FYROM follow the path of development, modernization and orientation towards the European Union.

#### **4. European Union (EU)**

The European Union was initiated in 1951 in the Treaty of Paris, which established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a joint of France and German coal and steel industries. Later in 1957, in the Treaty of Rome, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were established between the six European countries of Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and France, in order to create a common market and enhance relations between the partners. Finally, in 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht established the Treaty of European Union (EU), which created the political union amongst the member states with the main policy provisions of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Citizenship (US), and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (VAN OUDENAREN, 2000).<sup>143</sup> European integration is based on these four treaties. These treaties have been amended in particular when a new member joins the European Union. Today, the European Union consists of fifteen member states. The European Union through the treaties between the fifteen European countries extends its competence to the economy, industry, politics, citizens' rights and foreign policy.

The European countries that belong to the EU are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. On 1 January 1981, Greece became the

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<sup>142</sup> NATO. Operation Essential Harvest. Available on line, <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/skopje/harvest.htm>.

<sup>143</sup> John Van Oudenaren. *Uniting Europe: European Integration and the Post-Cold War World*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2000, pp. 8-64.

10<sup>th</sup> member of the European Community. Greece remains firmly committed to European integration. Greece's economic rate increases and from 01 January 2002 is a full member of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) treaty and applied for euro zone entry and adoption of the common European currency, the 'euro', in accordance with Article 122 of the EU EMU Treaty (HR-NET, 2002)<sup>144</sup>. The 'Euro' has been used in all European countries as the common currency since the beginning of 2002.

The Kosovo crisis was a challenge for the EU. The EU was present in Kosovo from the time the war ended on 10 June 1999 and Kosovo came under the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. The EU has provided Kosovo and the Southeastern European region with considerable assistance. Therefore, the same day that the UN Security Council imposed Resolution 1244 on Kosovo, on 10 June 1999 under the EU initiative, the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe was adopted in Germany, Cologne. The partners of this Pact consist of more than 40 countries or organizations. This political declaration is trying to substitute the old reactive crisis intervention policy in Southeastern Europe with a comprehensive long-term conflict prevention strategy. Furthermore, the EU's experiences and lessons learned from other international crisis settlements established the basis of the Stability Pact. The EU believes that conflict prevention and peace building can be successful in three areas which are the creation of a secure environment, the promotion of sustainable democratic systems and the promotion of economic and social well-being. Thus, the Stability Pact sustains its efforts to accommodate this three dimension process. (SPC, 2002).<sup>145</sup> The structure of the Stability Pact is based on three Working Tables. Table one refers to Democratization and Human Rights, table two refers to Economic Reconstruction and table three refers to Security Issues. See Figure 10.

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<sup>144</sup> Hellenic Resources Network. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Greece EMU Membership Application. Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apcen/2000/00-03-09.apcen.html>.

<sup>145</sup> Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe. Available on line, [http://www.stabilitypact.org/stabilitypactcgi/catalog/cat\\_descr.cgi?prod\\_id=1806](http://www.stabilitypact.org/stabilitypactcgi/catalog/cat_descr.cgi?prod_id=1806).




Figure 10. The Stability Pact Structure. (From: About the Stability Pact: <http://www.stabilitypact.org/>)

The EU through the Stability Pact is trying to draw Southeastern Europe closer to the idea of full integration. Special agreements have been signed that will help the candidate countries to enhance efforts to achieve the prerequisites for integration. The intention is to increase economic, political and social cooperation between the EU and the countries of Southeastern Europe. For this reason, the EU will allocate EURO 4.65 billion (\$4.04 billion) during 2002-2006. Also, EURO 1.1 billion (\$0.9 billion) was raised for projects in transportation, energy, telecommunications and supply (SPC, 2002).<sup>146</sup> Furthermore, EURO 378 million (\$328.6 million) provided in emergency humanitarian assistance for the victims of the Kosovo crisis and EURO 127 million (\$110.49 million) for reconstruction programs started immediately after the war. Continued support to Kosovo from the EU came with the allocation of EURO 360 million (\$313.2 million) in 2000 and EURO 350 million (\$304.5 million) (EUROPA,

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

2002).<sup>147</sup> Table 2 shows the total EU economic assistance in EURO spent in Kosovo. Table 3 shows the reconstruction assistance implementation of the EU in Kosovo.

EU support to Kosovo (in million of €)	1998	1999	2000	2001
<b>Reconstruction assistance</b>	7.5	127	275	320.0
<b>Humanitarian aid</b>		378(1)	50	12.5
<b>Financial assistance (macro-economic)</b>			35	30.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	7.5	505	360	362.5

(1) This amount was provided for supporting the region affected by the Kosovo crisis (Albania, FYROM, and Montenegro). Out of the €378 million, €111.7 million were directly spent in Kosovo.

Table 2. European Union Economic Assistance in EURO Spent in Kosovo. (From: European Union, The Challenge of the EU's Financial Contribution, Available on line: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/see/fry/kosovo/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fry/kosovo/index.htm))

	Budget Allocation	Commitment	Contracted	Disbursement
<b>1998 /99</b>	134.5	131.4	123.1	103.8
<b>2000</b>	275.0	270.9	230.6	183.3
<b>2001</b>	320.0	285.0	171.3	47.8

Table 3. Reconstruction Assistance Implementation (as of 28 May 2001). (From: European Union, The Challenge of the EU's Financial Contribution, Available on line: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/see/fry/kosovo/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fry/kosovo/index.htm))

Greece is a member of the Stability Pact. Greece believes that the Stability Pact can be the momentum for a new agreement of the Balkans between the international community and Southeastern Europe. The isolation of the Balkans and the abuse of ethnic rights must be replaced by coordinated efforts of the Stability Pact in order to

<sup>147</sup> European Union: The EU's Relations with the South Eastern Europe. Available on line, [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/see/fry/kosovo/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/fry/kosovo/index.htm).



achieve cooperation, stability and regional integration within the Balkan region. Greece, with all that resources can provide, contributes to the Stability Pact in order to participate in the encouragement of economic development, cooperation, and respect of international law in Southeastern Europe. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, referring in his speech to the Balkan's stability and improvement, noted that Greece's northern port of Thessaloniki is already a commercial and cultural center. After Brussels and Warsaw, Thessaloniki in Greece also claims the establishment of the third campus of the College of Europe that is a unique and innovative postgraduate institute for European studies. Also, the regional office for the Stability Pact and the office of the European Unions Reconstruction Agency for Southeastern Europe are based in Thessaloniki, (MOF, 2002).<sup>148</sup>

Greece's history and geographic location give it unique position to assist in the Europeanization of the Balkans and bring them into a common future of prosperity. As a fully integrated European state, Greece faces the challenges of globalization, technological changes, environmental degradation and organized crime. Greece's entry in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) could contribute to the prosperity and security of Southeastern Europe. This can be realized by enhancing efforts for regional cooperation and reconstruction.

Following the Cologne Summit, the Helsinki Summit of the European Council took place on 10 and 11 December 1999 in Finland. At this summit, the 15 EU members agreed that the European Common Foreign and Security Policy could be better achieved by improving the EU's defense capabilities. Thus, the 15 countries certified a military 'headline goal' for a 50,000 to 60,000 strong European crisis reaction force and ambitious capability targets. This force will be deployed in the next few years (WEU, 2002).<sup>149</sup> Greece should actively participate in the development of this military capability, and will assist in its foundation.

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<sup>148</sup> Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. De-Balkanizing the Balkans. Available on line, <http://www.greece.gr/POLITICS/SouthEastEurope/debalkanizingthebalkans1.stm>

<sup>149</sup> Assembly of WEU. The Interim European and Defense Assembly. Available on line, <http://www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/presentation/maastricht.html>.

Greece with its involvement in the Balkan infrastructure, cooperation and defense plays a considerable role in bilateral relations as committed by the EU mandate in the region. For this reason, Greece continues to advocate greater EU attention to the Balkans as well as the necessary funding for the region in order for stability to be achieved.

## **5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

In March 1948, under the Brussels Treaty, the five Western European countries of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom signed an agreement for a common defense system and to strengthen their ties in such a manner that would enable them to resist ideological, political and military threats to their security. Since then, the NATO members today total 19 countries. On 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was set up in Washington and consisted of 10 European and two North American independent nations (USA, CANADA) and they are committed to each other's defense. Greece joined in 1952. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO in 1999. The NATO country members are Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. NATO's essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the United Nations Charter (NATO, 2002).<sup>150</sup> The basic threat was the aggression by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, referred to as Russia. After the fall of the communist regime in 1989, and the division of the Soviet Union into its constituent republics, the Cold War with Russia ended. Western leaders began to think about what NATO's role should now be. NATO changed its focus and became involved in European Other Than War Operations (OTWO) such as 'peace-keeping' activities in the Balkan countries. The Balkan region has always been a sensitive area. World War I started there and ethnic differences, religious differences and territorial claims make the Balkan countries particularly unstable.

In response to Serbian aggression in Kosovo, NATO began air strikes under the operation 'Allied Force' against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 24 March

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<sup>150</sup> NATO Fundamental Security Tasks. Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0102.htm>.

1999. NATO's mission was to attack the Yugoslav military infrastructure with the objective of deterring future attacks on Albanian Kosovars (VAN OUDENAREN, 2000).<sup>151</sup>

On 29 May 1999, Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, speaking to the Greek government noted that Greece will not participate in any military operation in Kosovo (FLASH, 1999).<sup>152</sup> Greece has historic and religious ties to Serbia, and sought a peaceful resolution to the Kosovo crisis that would preserve Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and protect Kosovar Albanian human rights. Greece has consistently said it is opposed to the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia and has worked hard on the diplomatic front to seek a political settlement to the issue. Greece did not veto the NATO operation but it did not participate in the air operation because it is a neighboring country of both Albania and Yugoslavia and because it did not believe that military intervention would resolve the dispute. Furthermore, Greece allowed the port of Thessaloniki to be used for the passage of NATO troops and supplies to the peacekeeping force based in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. By doing this, Greece has successfully and without becoming internationally isolated, opposed the military operation. Following the above Greek Prime Minister speech to the Greek government, he added "Is there anyone in this chamber who thinks that Greece would be serving its interest or the interests of the region in cutting its ties with its partners and allies?" Furthermore Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis on 5 April 1999 in a televised address to the Greek nation noted that Greece's actions must be in cooperation with the other NATO countries and in contact with the Serbs. In any other case, Greece would have been alienated from all the involved parties. Greece's interests are not to be marginalized in the Balkans. In such a position, Greece would become part of the problem and not a contributor to its solution. (FLASH, 1999).<sup>153</sup>

Greece expressed serious reservations about the use of military force from the very start of the conflict. Greece was one of the first NATO allies to encourage an end to

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<sup>151</sup> John Van Oudenaren. *Uniting Europe: European Integration and the Post-Cold War World*. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2000 p. 301.

<sup>152</sup> Greek Embassy in USA. Flash News. Prime Minister Reiterates Athens Refusal to Participate in Kosovo War. Available on line, <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/nflash0529.htm>.

<sup>153</sup> Greek Embassy in USA. Flash News. Greece Backs NATO, Urges Political Solution for Kosovo. Available on line, [www.greekembassy.org/press/bulletin/apr99.html](http://www.greekembassy.org/press/bulletin/apr99.html).

air strikes and a return to political dialogue. Throughout the bombing campaign, it carried out efforts to resolve the Kosovo crisis and promote a peaceful resolution through diplomacy. Greece believes that violence must not be used in dealing with Balkan problems that inflame ethnic interests. The most appropriate means to fight ethnic tensions are the mutual understanding and cooperation between the countries.

Greece participated in NATO's operation 'Allied Harbor' in Albania in 1997 in order to secure the reception and distribution of humanitarian aid as well as to guarantee the smooth electoral procedures in this country. Greece contributes its peacekeeping forces every time necessary to assist with humanitarian aid. In Kosovo, should a peace agreement be reached, Greece would contribute forces to peacekeeping efforts.

According to a poll received in Greece on 30 April 1999, 96 percent of the Greek populace opposed NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia (GHMRC, 1999)<sup>154</sup>. Another poll conducted in Greece in May 1999 showed that 99.5 percent of Athens's inhabitants and its district, accounting for approximately one half of the Greek population, believe there is no justification for NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, on 29 April 1999, one Greek communist demonstration blocked a French military convoy from Thessaloniki to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (PHILHELLENIC, 1999).<sup>155</sup> Greek public opinion substantially affected NATO intervention in Yugoslavia. Therefore, Greek public policy about NATO air strikes in Yugoslavia was in agreement with Greek mass public opinion. On this occasion, both opinions were in agreement.

According to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, the North Atlantic Council authorized the deployment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The Greek Governmental Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense, by following the development of the Kosovo crisis, decided on 11 June 1999, to participate

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<sup>154</sup> Greek Helsinki Monitor and Minority Group. Greece. Available on line, <http://www.duth.gr/maillist-archives/thrace/tl54/msg00025.html>.

<sup>155</sup> Philhellenic Perspective. Popular Opposition in Greece to the War. Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/philper/pp9906>.

in KFOR in Kosovo at a brigade level contingent named the Greek Force Support Unit (GFSU) (NATO, 2002).<sup>156</sup>

NATO today adopts a new strategy, reorganizes its command system and changes the structure of its forces. The two main ways that NATO contributes to stability in Europe is through the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). EAPC is a multilateral forum where NATO member and partner countries discuss political and security issues and develop cooperation in a wide range of areas. PfP is the basis for practical security cooperation between NATO and individual Partner countries. Activities include defense planning and budgeting, military exercises and civil emergency operations (NATO, 2002).<sup>157</sup> Furthermore in Berlin in 1996, NATO foreign ministers decided to build up the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The purpose of this organization within the Alliance was to enable the European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to Alliance missions and activities, to reinforce the transatlantic partnership and to allow European Allies to act by themselves as required. Also, at the Brussels Summit of January 1994, the concept of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was launched. This is a multinational, multi-service deployable task force generated and tailored primarily, but not exclusively, for military operations not involving the defense of Alliance territory, such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping. CJTF full implementation is estimated to occur in late 2004 (NATO, 2000)<sup>158</sup>

Greece belongs to all the above organizations and participates in all the processes regarding NATO's transformation. Greece believes that the NATO restructuring and new enlargement to include southern Europe countries will enhance its capabilities and role as the only reliable political and military organization able to sustain peace in the Balkans as well as in Europe. According to the establishment of new NATO headquarters and regional commands, on May 1999, Greek Minister of Defense Akis Tsoatzopoulos, inaugurated the Greek sub-regional NATO headquarter in the city of Larissa in central

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<sup>156</sup> NATO. Greek Force Support Unit, Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/gfsu.htm>.

<sup>157</sup> NATO. Partnership for Peace. Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/pfp/partners.htm>.

<sup>158</sup> NATO The Combined Joint Task Force Concept. Available on line, <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/cjtf-con.htm>.

Greece (MACEDONIAN PRESS, 1999).<sup>159</sup> Furthermore, the Greek defense diplomacy thought NATO should focus on the following actions:

- Participation in the activities, exercises, and the decision-making mechanisms of the Alliance
- Support for NATO's evolution to a "common security" organization, as well as its enlargement
- Support for the establishment of NATO headquarters on Greek territory, in connection with the various NATO decisions concerning the development of a new NATO command structure (G.E., 2000)<sup>160</sup>

Developments of the last decade in the Balkans demonstrated the need for a more focused approach to the region. Greece strongly supports the open door dimension of Alliance cooperation with Partners that can assist the candidate countries in joining the NATO alliance. For that reason, Greece will continue to contribute to the efforts of these countries to establish and achieve the necessary criteria to achieve the overall goals of the Membership Action Plan in order to fully join NATO.

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<sup>159</sup> Macedonian Press Agency. News in Greek 99-10-05. Available on line, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpe/1999/99-10-05.mpe.html>.

<sup>160</sup> Greek Embassy in USA. Greece's Geostrategic Position.

## **VI. SURVEY DATA AND ANALYSIS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The Kosovo conflict affected the Balkan countries in forms of emerging relationships among important stakeholders, e.g., Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As a Balkan country, Greece was affected by the evolving situation, which was reflected in its policy for security and stability in the Balkans. A survey was conducted to obtain additional insights for answering the following research questions:

#### **1. Primary Research Question**

- How the Kosovo conflict affected the relationships among relevant regional stakeholders and what are the implications for Greece.

#### **2. Secondary Research Questions**

- What were the critical factors leading up to the Kosovo conflict?
- What were the actions of the international community to solve the Kosovo conflict?
- What is the present status in Kosovo?
- Who are the major stakeholders emerging from the Kosovo conflict?
- What are the relationships among regional potential stakeholders and Greece's stability foreign policy for security?

Survey data was used to help assess the consequences of the Kosovo conflict in Greece as well as Greece's redesigned post-Kosovo foreign stability policy for security in the Balkans presented in previous chapters. This chapter presents survey data and an analysis of the data collected. A description of the methodology used to conduct the survey is presented in the beginning. The survey was used for descriptive, explanatory and exploratory purposes to analyze the perceptions of 35 Greek officers attending the Naval Postgraduate School in March 2002. Although a relatively small sample was used, significant findings were realized about consequences of the Kosovo conflict and Greece's role in its foreign stability policy for security.

## **B. METHODOLOGY**

A researcher developed, Likert scaled instrument was administered to 35 participants. Twelve survey questions were grouped into two main categories to assess different aspects of the topic. The first six questions referred specifically to the Kosovo conflict from March to June of 1999 and the remaining six questions concerned Greek policy. Questions one through six were close-ended questions asking respondents to choose from a fixed set of response alternatives on a numerical Likert scale. Questions seven through twelve were close-ended and open-ended, asking respondents to choose from a fixed set of response alternatives, and to answer in their own words. At the beginning of the survey, two demographic items provided descriptive information about the respondent's branch of the Greek military (Army, Navy, Air Force) and years on active duty. Complete anonymity was promised and for this reason no names have been used in this study. A total of 35 Greek officers from all branches of the military agreed to willingly and without retribution provide their candid responses for this study. Specifically, there were five Greek Army officers, 23 Greek Navy officers, and seven Air Force officers. All of them are at the graduate educational level with an average of 12 years of military experience. Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with the statements provided. Each selected the most appropriate response based on a five-level Likert Rating Scale to specify how strongly they felt positively or negatively on an issue. In this survey, the 'No Opinion' point was used as a midpoint. Therefore, responses were analyzed in terms of significant (dis) agreement with a proposed statement using a Chi-square ( $\chi^2$ ) test for statistical significance. The purpose of the Chi-square test was to determine if the responses to each question were random or perhaps systematic (non-random). The number of categorical cells was grouped into 'agree' and 'disagree' options. The 'no opinion' cell was not taken into account in the Chi-square calculation formula. The Chi-square test was applied to the case where the degree of freedom was one ( $df = \text{number of cells} - 1$ ). The examined Chi-square reflects Goodness of Fit. An analytical expression is given in Appendix A. The critical value from the Chi-square distribution obtained with one degree of freedom using .05 level of significance is 3.84. Thus, when the calculated value of Chi-square is equal to or greater than the critical value 3.84, the probability that the responses did not occur



randomly is at least 95 percent or the probability that the responses were random is five percent or less.

Greece was affected by the Kosovo conflict and the new situation in the Balkans. Therefore, its foreign policy was reevaluated. Chapter V referred to the relations Greece has established with the five major stakeholders: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The survey was intended to focus on those relations affected by the consequences of the Kosovo conflict in order to ascertain some conclusions and recommendations on the Greek foreign stability policy for security in the Balkans. The 35 Greek officers attending the Naval Postgraduate School comprise a purposive sample. Although not necessarily reflective of the overall Greek population, the sample may reflect relatively common, Greek citizen perceptions.

### **C. SURVEY DATA OF GREEK OFFICERS**

The survey responses of the 35 Greek officers were evaluated using Greece's foreign stability policy for security and then analyzed statistically using the mean values, standard deviations, max, min, mode and Chi-square. The survey questionnaire data, as well as the data analysis, is presented in Appendix A.

#### **1. Questions Referring to the Consequences of the Kosovo Conflict in Greece**

The first category of questions one through six referred to some specific trends of the Kosovo conflict as reflected on Greek society and the economy. These questions were developed to validate the findings of the archival research that the Kosovo conflict influenced some specific Greek interests. The variables examined in these questions were Greek citizens, the migration of refugees into Greece, cross-border crime, environmental contamination, combat readiness, and the Greek economy as it relates to migration.

- **Question 1: The Kosovo conflict substantially disturbed many Greek citizens**

Results indicate that the responses to the first question are significant ( $\chi^2$  value greater than 3.84 and  $p \leq .05$ ). This indicates that the responses from the Greek officers in the first question are not random. The Greek officers significantly perceived that the Kosovo conflict substantially disturbed many Greek citizens. Results for question 1 are presented in Table 4.

Field	Question	Mean Value	Disagree	Agree	Agree or Disagree	Chi-Square	P<=. 05 Yes/No
Kosovo conflict consequences	1	4.11	3	30	Agree	25.03	Yes

Table 4. Question 1 Results.

- **Question 2: The Kosovo conflict substantially increased the migration of refugees into Greece**

Results were significant about whether or not the migration of refugees increased into Greece. Results indicate that the Greek officers perceive the migration of refugees substantially increased into Greece ( $\chi^2$  value greater than 3.84 and  $p \leq .05$ ). Results for question 2 are presented in Table 5.

Field	Question	Mean Value	Disagree	Agree	Agree or Disagree	Chi-Square	P<=. 05 Yes/No
Kosovo conflict consequences	2	3.71	7	27	Agree	18.05	Yes

Table 5. Question 2 Results.

- **Question 3: The Kosovo conflict substantially increased cross-border crime in Greece**

Analysis of the survey question on the cross-border crime yielded significant results ( $\chi^2$  value greater than 3.84 and  $p \leq .05$ ) and indicated that Greek officers perceive that cross-border crime substantially increased in Greece due to the Kosovo conflict. Results for question 3 are presented in Table 6.

Field	Question	Mean Value	Disagree	Agree	Agree or Disagree	Chi-Square	P<=. 05 Yes/No
Kosovo conflict consequences	3	3.62	7	24	Agree	15.05	Yes

Table 6. Question 3 Results.

- **Question 4: The Kosovo conflict generated considerable environmental contamination, e.g., depleted uranium**

Analysis of the survey question on environmental contamination, e.g., depleted uranium, yielded significant results ( $\chi^2$  value greater than 3.84 and  $p \leq .05$ ) indicating that Greek officers perceive considerable environmental contamination did occur due to the Kosovo conflict. Results for question 4 are presented in Table 7.

Field	Question	Mean Value	Disagree	Agree	Agree or Disagree	Chi-Square	P<=.05 Yes/No
Kosovo conflict consequences	4	3.57	5	20	Agree	13.06	Yes

Table 7. Question 4 Results.

- **Question 5: The Kosovo conflict substantially improved overall combat readiness of Greek Armed Forces**

Results indicate that the responses to this question were significant ( $\chi^2$  value greater than 3.84 and  $p \leq .05$ ). The Greek officers perceived that the overall combat readiness of Greek Armed Forces did not improve substantially based on the Kosovo conflict. Results for question 5 are presented in Table 8.

Field	Question	Mean Value	Disagree	Agree	Agree or Disagree	Chi-Square	P<=.05 Yes/No
Kosovo conflict consequences	5	2.82	19	12	Disagree	5.14	Yes

Table 8. Question 5 Results.

- **Question 6: The refugee migration hurt the Greek economy**

Analysis of the question on the migration consequences on the Greek economy did not yield significant results. Results indicate that perceptions vary as to whether the refugee migration hurt the Greek economy. Results for question 6 are presented in Table 9.

Field	Question	Mean Value	Disagree	Agree	Agree or Disagree	Chi-Square	P<=.05 Yes/No
Kosovo conflict consequences	6	2.94	15	13	Disagree	0.5	No

Table 9. Question 6 Results.

## 2. Questions Referring to the Greek Stability Policy for Security

The second category of questions seven through twelve referred to some changes in Greece's political imperatives on international perceptions and external policies due to the recent year of unrest in the Balkans and due to the Kosovo conflict. These questions were developed to assess the findings of the archival research for the new trends in the Greek foreign stability policy for security. The variables examined in these questions were the efforts of the Greek policy makers to decrease the migration of refugees to Greece, the result of long-term peace in Kosovo, Greece's enhanced role in organizations such as the European Union (EU) and NATO, Greece's role as a liaison and mediator in the EU and NATO, Greece's enhanced position and power because of its liaison and mediator role, and the effect of private sector investment in Greek foreign affairs.

- **Question 7: Greece policy makers must substantially increase efforts to diminish migration of refugees into Greece**

Results indicate that the responses to this question were significant ( $\chi^2$  value greater than 3.84 and  $p \leq .05$ ). The Greek officers perceive that Greek policy makers must substantially increase efforts to decrease the migration of refugees into Greece. Results for the seventh question are presented in Table 10.

Field	Question	Mean Value	Disagree	Agree	Agree or Disagree	Chi-Square	P<=.05 Yes/No
Kosovo conflict consequences	7	3.91	4	26	Agree	20.4	Yes

Table 10. Question 7 Results.

Comments to this question are listed below. Comments were edited for presentation purposes only.

**Agree Comments:**

Migration should be controlled to the level that the Greek economy can accommodate. Illegal immigrants should be identified and either deported or given a green card. Illegal immigrant presence leads to unsubstantial means and therefore criminal action.

Greece cannot afford too many refugees at economical and social levels.

It is necessary for Greece policy makers to diminish migration of refugees into Greece, because of minority issues and crime increase.

There are already too many foreign immigrants in Greece and this situation has caused a lot of problems.

Greece is a small country and cannot economically support all these people; unemployment rate is high so the only thing we take is the rise of crime.

With the migration of refugees the unemployment and crime are increasing.

Migration of refugees increases unemployment and decreases the number of jobs for Greek citizens.

Greece's first priority is economy and uncontrolled migration will eventually pose threats.

Greece was unprepared for the amount of refugees that crossed borders last decade. Greece cannot absorb more refugees for the moment.

Problems with the Albanian minority are already enough. Unemployment is also too high to be increased more.

Refugees are a source of problems generally.

**Disagree Comments:**

I strongly disagree for humanitarian reasons. Where can they go? Greeks were always friendly to refugees; they had been refugees themselves 50 years ago.

- **Question 8: The current approach of combining military and political structures (KFOR, UNMIK) will likely result in long-term peace in Kosovo**

Analysis of the survey question on combining the military and political structure for long-term peace in Kosovo did not yield significant results. Comments indicate that the Greek officers varied in their perceptions about whether the political structure UNMIK and the military structure KFOR will result in long-term peace for Kosovo. Results for question 8 are presented in Table 11.

Field	Question	Mean Value	Disagree	Agree	Agree or Disagree	Chi-Square	P<=.05 Yes/No
Kosovo conflict consequences	8	2.88	14	13	Disagree	0.00	No

Table 11. Question 8 Results.

Comments to this question are listed below.

#### **Agree Comments:**

War actions will be prevented.

It is probably the only way to maintain peace in an area characterized so many differences (ethnic, religious, historical etc) among local population.

I believe KFOR and UNMIK are the only organizations, which can guarantee peace and impartiality.

I believe these organizations will result in long-term peace in Kosovo as far as the hate between the people living at these areas will be eliminated.

#### **No opinion Comments:**

It is one of the factors that may contribute to establishing peace but not the only one.

I think that the ethnic differences at this area are very deep. Sooner or later the volcano will erupt again.

**Disagree Comments:**

KFOR and UNMIK will not affect the will of the people.

The local population is not feeling comfortable with the foreign military presence.

There is no way to long-term peace without democratic reforms, stable government, economic rehabilitation, and ethic reconciliation.

Kosovo belongs to its people. I believe that finally a political solution will give this land back to its people.

Peace is never achieved through military force or political resolutions. They might impose peace for a finite period of time, but will not solve the problems.

A long lasting solution in Kosovo can be found only after peaceful negotiations between the ethnic groups.

These organizations presence does not solving any problems; just covers differences, which may guide to unpredictable situations.

KFOR and UNMIK seem to be incapable of solving the problem.

- **Question 9: Greece (politicians and military) should play a more active role with the EU and NATO to enforce peace and stability in the East Balkans**

Results were significant concerning whether or not the Greek politicians and Greek military leaders should play a more active role in the EU and NATO to enforce peace and stability in the East Balkans. Results indicate that the Greek officers perceive Greece, both the politicians and military, should play a more active role ( $\chi^2$  value greater than 3.84 and  $p \leq .05$ ). Results for question 9 are presented in Table 12.

Field	Question	Mean Value	Disagree	Agree	Agree or Disagree	Chi-Square	P<=. 05 Yes/No
Kosovo conflict consequences	9	4.51	1	33	Agree	30.03	Yes

Table 12. Question 9 Results.

Comments to this question are listed below.

**Agree Comments:**

Yes because peace and stability in Balkans implies more stability and fewer dangers for Greece too.

The Balkans is in the Greek 'region of interest' and therefore Greece should be able to pull the strings in the area and establish a leading role.

Greece is the best candidate for this, because of its stability, economy, and culture. Good relations with Balkan countries.

Greece is the only Balkan country that is member of both EU and NATO

The strategic interests of Greece will be served better only if Greece is part of the process.

Poverty and ethnic hatred in neighboring countries could result in unstable regimes whose collapse could hamper the Greek society.

Greece should try to establish herself as the dominant Balkan Power and stability factor.

Greece is geographically part of the Balkans and of course would like peace and stability in this area.

Greece is the closest NATO country in the East Balkans and instability in this area influences us too.

Because of its geographical position, Greece should be concerned more than everyone else in establishing peace and stability in the area.

Greece must be the lighthouse in the Balkans as the only EU and NATO member in the area and to promote their values.

We (Greeks) are the only Balkan nation being both a NATO and EU member. It is our duty to present the problems of this area to these two organizations.

- **Question 10: Greece should perform a more substantial liaison and mediator role between EU/NATO and Balkans**

Results were significant concerning whether or not Greece should play a more substantial liaison and mediator role between the EU/NATO and the Balkans. Results indicate that the Greek officers perceive Greece should perform a more substantial liaison



and mediator role ( $\chi^2$  value greater than 3.84 and  $p \leq .05$ ). Results for question 10 are presented in Table 13.

Field	Question	Mean Value	Disagree	Agree	Agree or Disagree	Chi-Square	P<=.05 Yes/No
Kosovo conflict consequences	10	4.48	1	32	Agree	29.03	Yes

Table 13. Question 10 Results.

Comments to this question are listed below.

**Agree Comments:**

To establish a most secure peace in the area. Greece is in a crucial area and has many interests in the Balkans.

Cultural ties and mutual understanding provide for better trust of Greeks compared to others.

Greece is the only Balkan country that is member of both EU and NATO.

The way Greece can boost its strategic interests in the area like stability, prosperity, and respect of the status quo of the borders.

This procedure is a good way to control things or influence the other partners of EU/NATO and Balkans.

I strongly agree, due to the fact that only Greece at this moment is in the position to keep stability in Balkans.

Because Greece is the only Balkan country which is a member of these organizations and is aware of the particular problems and the whole situation more than the other members of EU/NATO.

This would substantially increase Greece's prestige and influence among the Balkan nations.

The only way to stay out of the problem is to be mediator. There is no need to support any of both sides acting this way.

I agree, because Greece as a Balkan country knows the problems well and the other countries in the Balkans felt more comfortable with Greece as a mediator.

#### **Disagree Comments:**

Greece should not try to promote the ideas and solutions of the EU/NATO in the Balkans, but rather those solutions that support Greek interests. These interests are not always in agreement with the EU and they are in total disagreement with the NATO.

- **Question 11: Increased Greek liaison and mediator involvement will enhance Greece's overall position and power in EU/NATO**

Results were significant concerning whether or not increased Greek liaison and mediator involvement will enhance Greece's overall position and power in the EU/NATO. Results indicate that the Greek officers perceived that Greece will enhance its overall position and power ( $\chi^2$  value greater than 3.84 and  $p \leq .05$ ). Results for question 11 are presented in Table 14.

Field	Question	Mean Value	Disagree	Agree	Agree or Disagree	Chi-Square	P<=.05 Yes/No
Kosovo conflict consequences	11	4.14	3	29	Agree	24.03	Yes

Table 14. Question 11 Results.

Comments to this question are listed below.

#### **Agree Comments:**

It will prove once again the steady position of Greece to these organizations.

An active member is a valuable member.

The rest of the allies will depend more on Greece in the Balkans.

Greece will become the credible partner for Balkan issues whose opinion would be needed by both NATO/EU and Balkan regional problems.

The stronger you get involved the better you seem to be as a strong and powerful country.

Make Greece look stronger among other countries.

Because in this way Greece will show in practice that tries for peace at this area and Greece's allies can count on Greece.

Greece will become a more important member of these organizations by proving capabilities of undertaking a so significant role.

A successful mediator will present Greece as a strong and reliable partner in EU/NATO.

It will prove that Greece is a useful ally, capable of undertaking any project.

**Disagree Comments:**

Only if Balkan countries ask for Greece's mediator involvement and the Western EU/ NATO countries accept that. Otherwise Greece doesn't have the power.

Greek interests are not in agreement with EU/NATO.

The overall position has nothing to do with how much you involve but with how strong you are.

- **Question 12: Continued and increased Greek private sector investment in Albania and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) will substantially improve relations between Greece and these countries**

Results were significant concerning whether or not continued and increased investment by the Greek private sector in Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) will substantially improve relations between Greece and these countries. Results indicate that the Greek officers perceived that investment by the Greek private sector will improve relations between Greece and Albania as well as between Greece and FYROM ( $\chi^2$  value greater than 3.84 and  $p \leq .05$ ). Results for question 12 are presented in Table 15.

Field	Question	Mean Value	Disagree	Agree	Agree or Disagree	Chi-Square	P<=.05 Yes/No
Kosovo conflict consequences	12	4.11	3	29	Agree	24.03	Yes

Table 15. Question 12 Results.

Comments to this question are listed below.

**Agree Comments:**

In some cases will be an improvement. But there are other issues, like the Greek minority that may cause tense between the two countries (or the Albanians in Greece).

Because through economical relations will be increased the contact between populations.

Business and money can be a powerful link.

Boost economic prosperity and growth; improve stability, therefore the relations between the states.

Diminishing poverty and providing for economic growth in these countries will have an effect similar to the U.S. in Europe after World War II.

Every investment improves the way of life (direct or indirect) of citizens of these countries so the between us relationship will be enhanced.

Common economical gains are achieved.

Economic control of those countries by Greek companies is the backbone of the general relations that Greece will have.

In that way these countries will need more and more the help of Greece, in order to improve their economy, which will result in the total improvement of relations between them and Greece.

Controlling the economy of any nation is equivalent to controlling the nation itself.

The economical interests will reduce the political differences.

Financial activities of course bring people together, but sometimes ambitions politicians with ethnic pursuits, do not hesitate to destroy financial prosperity in order to achieve their goals.

**Disagree Comments:**

It will improve relations between Greek investors and those countries, not between Greece as a country.

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## **VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This research examined the Kosovo problem with particular emphasis on how the Kosovo conflict affected relationships among relevant regional stakeholders, including implications for Greece. The study examined the historical and social background of the Balkans, the revival of nationalist pursuits in the area, the military intervention from NATO forces, and the current status in Kosovo and the Balkans. Greece was affected by the unrest and is concerned with improving regional security and stability.

Greece's post-Kosovo conflict foreign policy for stability in the Balkans was framed using a stakeholder analysis approach. Greece's relationship with major regional stakeholders was derived. Additionally, direct and indirect consequences of the Kosovo conflict were analyzed using a researcher developed Questionnaire administered to 35 Greek officers (Army, Navy, Air Force) attending the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.

This chapter draws conclusions based on the above mentioned data sources, plus analysis of applicable literature on the topic. Although the number of surveyed Greek officers is relatively small, their responses provide a relevant and interesting snapshot concerning the topic. Each participant Greek officer was assumed to represent common Greek citizens with an average or above average level of knowledge of the Balkans Kosovo conflict. The promise of complete anonymity hopefully yielded honest and open responses. This chapter concludes by providing some policy recommendations.

### **A. CONCLUSIONS**

#### **1. Conclusions Based on Survey Results ( $p \leq .05$ )**

**The Kosovo Conflict may have substantially disturbed many Greek citizens.**

**Migration of refugees into Greece due to the Kosovo Conflict may have been of substantial concern to the Greek public.**

**The Kosovo Conflict may have raised cross-border crime into in Greece.**

**Environmental contamination from the Kosovo Conflict (e.g., depleted uranium) may be a matter of considerable concern to the Greek public.**

**The Kosovo Conflict may not have improved confidence in the overall combat readiness of Greek Armed Forces within the command Forces themselves.**

**Greece policy makers may substantially increase efforts to diminish migration of refugees into Greece.**

**Greece (politicians and military) should play a more active role with the EU and NATO to enforce peace and stability in the East Balkans.**

**Greece should perform a more substantial liaison and mediator role between EU/NATO and Balkans.**

**Increased Greek liaison and mediator involvement may enhance Greece's overall position and power in EU/NATO.**

**Continued and increased Greek private sector investment in Albania and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) may substantially improve relations between Greece and these countries.**

## **2. Additional Conclusions**

- Post Cold-War international focus has shifted from a East-West, Central –Europe domain, to a European perimeter, Balkan domain**

The collapse of the communist regimes and the end of the Cold War were events that impacted European actual and perceived security. Dormant rivalries were awakened. The Balkans primarily, the Southeastern part, faced drastic political transitions, severe economic problems, and ethnic crisis among several national minorities. The historical confrontation between East and West appeared to migrate to the European periphery known as the Balkans. This Post Cold-War shift towards the Balkans is creating emerging new relationships among an array of Nation-States, NATO, and European Union stakeholders.

- Although the Balkans and Kosovo conflicts may appear new to some, the roots of many disputes are three and four hundred years old**

Origins of these disputes can be traced to the following factors: the ethnicity of the minorities; different religions; different cultures; and a history of economic and social problems. These factors influenced the Kosovo conflict, mostly in terms of nationalistic claims of Kosovar Albanians. NATO, the European Union and the United Nations were



major institutions contributing to the evolution of events in the Balkan region after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. NATO carried out all the air strike missions with or without allied assistance. This intervention in Kosovo appeared to positively enhance NATO's role as the world's crisis manager. NATO's presence remained in Kosovo after the end of the air strikes as the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

The European Union undertook to implement a common foreign and security policy. The initiation of the Stability Pact attempts to substitute an old, reactive crisis intervention policy in Southeastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy. The United Nations also played a critical role in the Balkans. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 formalized the peace in Kosovo. This resulted in the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) declaring permanent peace and a solution to the Kosovo conflict.

Restoring full political order in Kosovo is obviously a major challenge. The KFOR and UNMIK administrations have managed to maintain relative peace in Kosovo. There are many remaining challenges for normality and stability to be established in Kosovo. The goal of creating and maintaining an environment of safety and peace in the Balkan area is the first priority of these multinational administrations.

- **There are still issues which threaten Kosovo regional stability**

The Kosovo conflict revealed persistent problems in the Balkan region: economic underdevelopment; aggressive ethnic minorities; refugees flow and illegal immigration; cross-border crime; lack of democratic institutions; and environmental contamination. These problems create challenges for stakeholders inside and outside the immediate Balkan region. A common Balkan and European approach, with NATO support, is likely the only framework whereby these complex and messy issues can be resolved over many years.

- **Greece's role in the region is expanding in terms of a communication crossroads and regional peace-maker**

Greece is often depicted as being at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa. This geopolitical, continent-linking position catapults Greece into the role of strategic bridge and regional peace-maker. Greece is the only Balkan country that is a member of the European Union and NATO. It is also a member of the United Nations (UN), the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Western European Union (WEU). Greece's geopolitical importance as well as its membership in the European Union and NATO organizations depicts Greece's opportunity to play an increasing strategic role in the region. Greece is successfully contributing to an emerging European Balkan policy. Greece supports the establishment of good relations among all Balkan countries through the following: internationally recognized principles of the inviolability of borders, full respect for the human rights of ethnic communities, the peaceful resolution of differences; involvement in the Balkan infrastructure, cooperation and defense; and participation in international missions.

- **Greece facilitates good relationships with its neighbor countries and assists them by providing humanitarian assistance; economic assistance; and contributing to the efforts of candidate countries to establish and achieve the necessary criteria to join international organizations**

Regarding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania, and FYROM, Greece contributes in the economic sector with investment and commercial activities, and political and economic initiatives. Greece becomes a bridge between the security in the Balkans and Europe. Greece can also help its neighbor countries to prepare for European integration. The process for a Balkan country to join the European Union membership is difficult because it requires a certain economic and political level for accession. The Balkan countries need European assistance to reach that level. The same level of difficulty is included in the process for a country to join the NATO membership as a full member. Greece can assist a Balkan country towards achieving full NATO membership. Greece provides this assistance based on the principles of respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Balkan stability and security are vital for European security. Europe realized that security could be sustained only if there is peace in the Balkan region. This is designated with the initiation of the Stability Pact. Greece realized that Balkan peace is related to the stability and security in the Balkan region. Greece's relationships with the Balkan countries is not only from a bilateral perspective, but is also aligned with the European Union and NATO mandates and policies aimed towards long-term cooperation. Greece's geopolitical position, its relations with the Balkan countries, the cooperation

within the sector of international organizations, and its political will for peace constitutes a source of stability in South-Eastern Europe.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS: AN UNOFFICIAL PERSPECTIVE**

- **The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) efforts should focus on a long-term solution to Kosovo**

The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) plays a significant role in settling peace in Kosovo by performing all the principal administrative functions such as law and order, health, mail, and education. Now that peace is restored the next step is the Kosovo's status. The conflict in Kosovo showed that finding a stable and lasting settlement might be difficult. The Kosovo status is better to be seen within a 'Total Balkan Approach', a regional approach to democracy, security, and prosperity (MOA, 2002).<sup>161</sup> Kosovo could exist with substantial autonomy, but within the borders of Yugoslavia, with respect of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity and respect for the region's minorities. Balkan countries in cooperation with the international community must collaborate and find alternatives to solve all the Balkan ethnic disputes including Kosovo. Negotiations among the Balkan countries can strengthen civil society, improve conditions for economic development and enhance prospects for integration in the European Union and NATO. With respect for local and international interests, this collaboration will stop ethnic minority conflicts and will give the opportunity for peace to last in the region.

- **The European Union should support inclusion of southeastern Europe Balkan countries into the EU**

The Kosovo conflict demonstrated the need for the Balkan countries to participate in the European Union. The Cold War consequences on Europe and specifically in the Balkans can be overcome only when politically and economically unstable areas join cohesive international organizations such as the European Union. The economic and military peacekeeping EU assistance to Kosovo as well as the Stability Pact initiation determined the European Union leading role in the Balkan region. European Union enlargement into the Balkan countries must be within an expandable process. This

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<sup>161</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Total Balkan Approach. Available online at, <http://www.greece.gr/POLITICS/SouthEastEurope/TotalBalkanApproach.stm>.

process must consider the prerequisites criteria needed for integration, as well as the urgent need for the southeastern Balkan countries of EU integration.

- **The European Council through its Committee on the Environment, Regional Planning and Local Authorities should strengthen international rules on environmental protection in cases of military actions**

The environmental impact of the Kosovo conflict crossed over the boundaries of Yugoslavia. Environmental consequences occurred in adjacent areas on neighboring countries. Water and air contamination from ordnance used by the NATO military forces (depleted uranium) have impacted the health of the population of the area as well as transboundary consequences. Depleted uranium is likely to increase cancer among the people of the affected areas. Furthermore this danger is applied to the humanitarian assistance forces in Kosovo. The Rio Declaration on Environment of 1992 and other United Nations resolutions should be reaffirmed by the European environmental committee to strength its environmental policy in Europe. Furthermore the evaluation of damage and environmental rehabilitation should be prioritized in the post-Kosovo conflict Balkans reconstruction agenda.

- **NATO should continue reforming its strategic goals, structures, and functions and should consider a next round of enlargement to include southeastern Balkan countries**

As reaffirmed on 24 April 1999 in the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the creation of NATO, it is facing the challenges of the post-Cold War era. A substantial change must be sustained in order for the Euro Atlantic alliance to transform from a purely deterrent military organization, to a security organization with parallel political, diplomatic and military character. The primary mission will be the preservation of peace. Today the primary threat comes from ethnic, economical, social, and environmental tensions that create instability in the regions. Furthermore, NATO must be prepared to prevent and manage organized violence emerging from extremist actions, ethnic minority disputes, religious fundamentalism, cross-border crime, drug trafficking, mass refugee movements, and environmental threats (MOD, 2000)<sup>162</sup>. NATO in its first round of enlargement welcomed the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The Kosovo conflict increased the number of countries wanting to join the NATO alliance. NATO should consider a second

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<sup>162</sup> Greek Ministry of Defence. Leyki Biblos Gia Tis Enoples Dynameis. 1998-1999, p. 15.

round of enlargement to include countries of southeastern Europe to further stabilize the region, e.g., Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and FYROM. The alliance should assist these countries to achieve the prerequisite economic and political qualifications for their inclusion in NATO.

- **Greece should continue to support the establishment of good neighborly relations and the development of close economic ties among all Balkan countries in order to promote its stabilization policy**

The unrest in the Balkans has made a great impact on Greece and on Europe in general. The emerged new states, the ethnic minorities, and the disputes of the borders are the main elements of this impact. These characteristic elements challenge the security in Europe, which has appeared as the dominant political issue in the region. The security issue includes military concerns, human rights protection, democratic principles, and economic development. This term of security can only be guaranteed with stability in the region. Greece, as the only country in southeastern Europe which belongs to the European Union and NATO, and as the regions European model for economic and democratic reforms, supports the establishment of good neighborly relations and the integration of these countries into EU and NATO. An integration of these neighbor countries of southeastern Europe in these organizations could greatly contribute to the stability, economic prosperity and peace in Europe. The relationship of the Balkans with the EU and NATO will be influential in the creation of an internal Balkan cooperation. Otherwise there is high likelihood of further destabilization in the region. Greece's stability policy for security should be established on the principles of the territorial integrity of countries, the inviolability of borders, respect of human and minority rights, and the peaceful resolution of differences.

- **Greece should legalize the Albanian illegal immigrants to integrate foreign workers into Greek society and enforce the law for the illegal immigrants who are engaged in criminal activities**

Greece has hosted a large amount of immigrants. These low-wage workers have a positive impact on the Greek economy, particularly in construction, tourism, and housework. These immigrants also bolster the Albanian economy with their remittances. It is in the mutual interest of both Greece and Albania for Albanian immigrants to work legally in Greece. Greece should legalize the immigrants who have proof of employment.

This will help to ensure that Albanian immigrants are actively involved in Greek society, and receive full access to social services (MOF, 1999)<sup>163</sup>. The illegal immigrants involved in criminal activities should be detained and deported. Such a process will be under the respect of human rights. Furthermore cooperation between Greece and Albania will provide alternatives for the problem of illegal immigration and organized crime. Approachable ways of legalizing illegal immigrants will benefit both countries and will diminish the illegal immigrants crime activities. Also it would be a leverage for the Greek minority in Albania and its treatment.

- **Greece should continue to improve its economic diplomacy in the Balkan region to implement its foreign stability policy for security**

Greece places special emphasis on economic diplomacy as a means for strengthening economic, cultural ties, and understanding between itself and its neighbors. The Greek government should continue to encourage private foreign investment as a matter of foreign policy. Today Greek investment and trade exchanges with Greece's neighbors have increased. A special organization named Bilateral Economic Cooperation Bureau has been initiated since 1995 to facilitate the processes and procedures needed for a Greek company to activate its business in a foreign country. Greek investment is given special attention in the areas of energy, telecommunications, transport, construction, and shipping. Investment is a means of collaboration between the countries. Balkan countries having moved politically from confrontation to cooperation, providing for themselves increased economic opportunities. Investment is the main factor to improve relationships and enhance stability. It is common knowledge that a strong foreign policy relies on a strong economy. Good relations with other nations pass through private investment initiatives as well as economic cooperation that is mutually beneficial to the countries and individuals involved. According to Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, one of the keys to stability and success is investment (TRIBUNE, 2000)<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. George Papandreou Meets Albanian Counterpart Pascal Milo. Available online at, <http://www.papandreou.gr/july99/gpapmilo9799English.html>.

<sup>164</sup> World Tribune. Will Foreign Investments Bring Peace to the Balkans? Available online at, <http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/Archive-2000/mz05-10.html>.

## **APPENDIX A. SURVEY**

### **A. CHI-SQUARE TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE**

A researcher developed, Likert scaled instrument was administered to 35 participants. Twelve survey questions were grouped into two main categories to assess different aspects of the topic. The first six questions referred specifically to the Kosovo conflict from March to June of 1999 and the remaining six questions concerned Greek policy. Questions one through six were close-ended questions, asking respondents to choose from a fixed set of response alternatives (numerical Likert scale). Questions seven through twelve were close-ended and open-ended, asking respondents to choose from a fixed set of response alternatives, and to answer in their own words. At the beginning of the survey, two demographic items provided descriptive information about the respondent's branch of the Greek military (Army, Navy, Air Force) and years on active duty. Complete anonymity was promised and for this reason no names have been used in this study. A total of 35 Greek officers from all branches of the Greek military agreed to willingly and without retribution provide their candid responses for this study. Specifically, there were five Greek Army officers, 23 Navy officers, and seven Air Force officers. All of them are at the graduate educational level with an average of 12 years of military experience. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed to the statements provided. Each selected the most appropriate response based on a five-level Likert Rating Scale to specify how strongly they felt positively or negatively on an issue. The Likert Rating Scale is presented below:

1. Strongly Disagree (SA)
2. Disagree (D)
3. No Opinion (NO)
4. Agree (A)
5. Strongly Agree (SA)

In this survey, the 'No Opinion' point was used as a midpoint. Therefore, responses were analyzed in terms of significant (dis)agreement with a proposed statement using a Chi-square ( $\chi^2$ ) test for statistical significance. The purpose of the Chi-square test was to determine if the responses to each question were random or perhaps systematic (non-random). The number of categorical cells was grouped into 'agree' and 'disagree'

options. The ‘no opinion’ cell was not taken into account in the Chi-square calculation formula. The Chi-square test was applied to the case where the Degree of Freedom was one (df = number of cells – 1). The examined Chi-square test reflects Goodness of Fit. The obtaining critical value from the Chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom using .05 level of significance is 3.84. Thus, when the calculated value of Chi-square is equal to or greater than the critical value 3.84, the probability that the responses did not occur randomly is at least 95 percent or the probability that the responses were random is five percent or less. Figure A-1 shows the formula of the Goodness of Fit test.

$$X^2 = \frac{(M-m-1)^2}{M+m}$$

M = Majority  
m = Minority

Figure A-1. Goodness of Fit Test Formula.

Table A-1 shows the critical values of Chi-square for Degrees of Freedom (df) = 1.

Degrees of Freedom	.05	.025	.01	.005	.001
1	3.84	5.02	6.63	7.88	10.83

Table A-1. Chi-Square Critical values

Figure A-2 shows a graphical representation of the Chi-square critical value with 1 degree of freedom at .05 level of significance.






Figure A-2. Chi-Square Critical Value for 1df.

The steps for the Chi-square test of significance procedure in this survey are:

- Set Hypothesis:
  - $H_0$ : The two categorical variables are not significantly different (random)
  - $H_1$ : The two categorical variables are significantly different (not random)
- Choose level of significance
- Calculate test statistic:  $\chi^2$
- Determine degrees of freedom: 1
- Compare test statistic with Table A-1 value
- Make decision

When  $\chi^2 \geq 3.84$ ,  $p \leq .05$  then reject the null hypothesis  $H_0$  and conclude that the responses to the questions were not random.

## B. QUESTIONS

The survey was conducted to obtain additional insights for answering the following research questions:

1. **Primary Research Question**
  - How the Kosovo conflict affected the relationships among relevant regional stakeholders and what are the implications for Greece.
2. **Secondary Research Questions**
  - What were the critical factors leading up to the Kosovo conflict?

- What were the actions of the international community to solve the Kosovo conflict?
- 
- What is the present status in Kosovo?
- Who are the major stakeholders emerging from the Kosovo conflict?
- What are the relationships among regional potential stakeholders and Greece's stability foreign policy for security?

Survey data was used to help assess the consequences of the Kosovo conflict in Greece as well as Greece's redesigned post-Kosovo foreign stability policy for security in the Balkans presented in previous chapters.

The survey was used for descriptive, explanatory and exploratory purposes to analyze the perceptions of 35 Greek officers attending at the Naval Postgraduate School in March 2002. The survey questionnaire is presented below:

### **QUESTIONNAIRE**

The results of this questionnaire will be used to complete my thesis titled: "The Kosovo Conflict: Emerging Relationships and Implications for Greece". Please complete the questionnaire by circling a response for each question. Space has been provided for your comments. Complete anonymity is promised. No names will be used in this study. Thank you for your valuable participation.

Branch of Greek military                      Army O                      Navy O                      Air Force O

Years of active-duty service                      \_\_\_\_\_                      \_\_\_\_\_                      \_\_\_\_\_

Please respond to all the following statements. The first six questions refer specifically to the Kosovo Conflict (Mar-Jun, 1999). Additional statements refer to Greek policy.

<b>Strongly</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly</b>
<b>Disagree</b>		<b>Opinion</b>		<b>Agree</b>

The Kosovo Conflict:

- |   |                |               |                |               |                |
|---|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| 1. Substantially <u>disturbed many Greek citizens</u> .   | <b>SD</b><br>O | <b>D</b><br>O | <b>NO</b><br>O | <b>A</b><br>O | <b>SA</b><br>O |
| 2. Substantially <u>increased the migration</u> of refugees into Greece.  | <b>SD</b><br>O | <b>D</b><br>O | <b>NO</b><br>O | <b>A</b><br>O | <b>SA</b><br>O |
| 3. Substantially <u>increased cross-border crime</u> in Greece.   | <b>SD</b><br>O | <b>D</b><br>O | <b>NO</b><br>O | <b>A</b><br>O | <b>SA</b><br>O |
| 4. Generated considerable <u>environmental contamination</u> , e.g., depleted uranium.  | <b>SD</b><br>O | <b>D</b><br>O | <b>NO</b><br>O | <b>A</b><br>O | <b>SA</b><br>O |
| 5. Substantially <u>improved overall combat readiness</u> of Greek Armed Forces.  | <b>SD</b><br>O | <b>D</b><br>O | <b>NO</b><br>O | <b>A</b><br>O | <b>SA</b><br>O |
| 6. The refugee <u>migration hurt the Greek economy</u>  | <b>SD</b><br>O | <b>D</b><br>O | <b>NO</b><br>O | <b>A</b><br>O | <b>SA</b><br>O |
| 7. Greece policy makers must substantially <u>increase efforts</u> to diminish migration of refugees into Greece.<br>Why / Why not? _____<br>_____<br>_____                             | <b>SD</b><br>O | <b>D</b><br>O | <b>NO</b><br>O | <b>A</b><br>O | <b>SA</b><br>O |
| 8. The current approach of combining military and political structures (KFOR, UNMIK) will likely <u>result in long-term peace</u> for Kosovo.<br>Why / Why not? _____<br>_____<br>_____ | <b>SD</b><br>O | <b>D</b><br>O | <b>NO</b><br>O | <b>A</b><br>O | <b>SA</b><br>O |

9. Greece (politicians and military) should play a more active role with the EU and NATO to enforce peace and stability in the East Balkans.
- |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>SD</b>             | <b>D</b>              | <b>NO</b>             | <b>A</b>              | <b>SA</b>             |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

Why / Why not? \_\_\_\_\_

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10. Greece should perform a more substantial liaison and mediator role between EU/NATO and Balkans.
- |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>SD</b>             | <b>D</b>              | <b>NO</b>             | <b>A</b>              | <b>SA</b>             |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

Why / Why not? \_\_\_\_\_

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11. Increased Greek liaison and mediator involvement will enhance Greece's overall position and power in EU/NATO.
- |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>SD</b>             | <b>D</b>              | <b>NO</b>             | <b>A</b>              | <b>SA</b>             |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

Why / Why not? \_\_\_\_\_

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12. Continued and increased Greek private sector investment in Albania and Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) will substantially improve relations between Greece and these countries.
- |                       |                       |                       |                       |                       |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>SD</b>             | <b>D</b>              | <b>NO</b>             | <b>A</b>              | <b>SA</b>             |
| <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

Why / Why not? \_\_\_\_\_

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## C. SURVEY DATA

Table A-2 presents the survey data received from the responses of the thirty-five Greek officers to the twelve applied questions.

Survey	Questions											
	Group 1						Group 2					
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	4	4	2
2	4	4	4	5	5	1	4	3	4	3	3	2
3	5	1	4	3	2	2	5	2	5	5	2	5
4	4	4	4	3	4	2	3	4	4	4	4	4
5	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	3	4	5	5	5
6	5	5	5	4	3	2	5	3	5	5	4	4
7	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	2	5	5	5	5
8	5	5	5	3	1	2	5	2	5	5	5	5
9	4	4	4	3	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	4
10	4	4	2	1	1	3	1	4	5	5	4	4
11	5	4	4	5	2	3	5	2	5	5	5	5
12	4	4	4	5	2	4	4	2	5	4	2	4
13	3	4	4	2	2	2	4	4	4	5	5	4
14	2	5	5	3	2	4	2	3	5	5	5	4
15	4	4	4	4	5	3	4	4	4	5	5	5
16	4	4	4	4	5	3	4	4	4	5	5	5
17	4	4	4	4	3	2	4	4	5	5	5	4
18	4	4	4	4	2	3	3	4	5	5	5	4
19	4	4	4	4	2	4	5	2	4	4	4	4
20	5	5	5	4	4	3	5	4	5	5	5	5
21	5	4	3	5	2	4	3	2	5	4	5	5
22	4	2	2	4	2	2	5	4	5	5	5	5
23	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
24	5	3	3	4	1	4	5	1	5	2	2	5
25	2	4	4	2	4	2	4	1	5	5	4	4
26	4	4	3	4	4	5	5	4	5	4	4	3
27	3	2	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
28	5	5	4	3	2	4	4	3	2	4	4	3
29	4	5	4	4	4	2	4	2	4	5	4	5
30	4	4	4	4	2	2	5	2	5	5	5	2
31	4	4	4	2	2	5	5	4	5	5	4	5
32	5	2	2	4	2	2	4	3	5	5	3	4
33	4	4	2	4	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	4
34	5	2	2	5	2	1	2	1	5	5	4	4
35	5	1	2	3	2	2	4	2	4	4	4	4

Table A-2. Survey Data.

#### D. SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS

Table A-3 presents the results of the survey data analysis of the responses received from the data of the thirty-five Greek officers to the twelve applied questions.

Questions	Mean	St.Dev.	Min	Max	Mode	Disagree	Agree	No Opinion	Agree Disagree	Chi Square	p<=.05 Yes/No
1	4.11	0.87	2	5	4	3	30	2	Agree	25.03	Yes
2	3.71	1.12	1	5	4	7	27	1	Agree	18.05	Yes
3	3.62	0.97	2	5	4	7	24	4	Agree	15.05	Yes
4	3.57	1.00	1	5	4	5	20	10	Agree	13.06	Yes
5	2.82	1.22	1	5	2	19	12	4	Disagree	5.14	Yes
6	2.94	1.08	1	5	2	15	13	7	Disagree	0.5	No
7	3.91	1.03	1	5	4	4	26	5	Agree	20.04	Yes
8	2.88	1.02	1	4	4	14	13	8	Disagree	0.00	No
9	4.51	0.70	2	5	5	1	33	1	Agree	30.03	Yes
10	4.48	0.74	2	5	5	1	32	2	Agree	29.03	Yes
11	4.14	0.91	2	5	4	3	29	3	Agree	24.03	Yes
12	4.11	0.90	2	5	4	3	29	3	Agree	24.03	Yes

Table A-3. Survey Data Analysis Results.

## **APPENDIX B. RESOLUTION 1199 (1998)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting on 23 September 1998**

The Security Council,

Recalling its [resolution 1160](#) (1998) of 31 March 1998,

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to that resolution, and in particular his report of 4 September 1998 (S/1998/834 and Add. 1),

Noting with appreciation the statement of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (the Contact Group) of 12 June 1998 at the conclusion of the Contact Group's meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Canada and Japan (S/1998/567, annex), and the further statement of the Contact Group made in Bonn on 8 July 1998 (S/1998/657),

Noting also with appreciation the joint statement by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 16 June 1998 (S/1998/526),

Noting further the communication by the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to the Contact Group on 7 July 1998, expressing the view that the situation in Kosovo represents an armed conflict within the terms of the mandate of the Tribunal,

Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the Secretary-General, the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes,

Deeply concerned by the flow of refugees into northern Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and other European countries as a result of the use of force in Kosovo, as well as by the increasing numbers of displaced persons within Kosovo, and other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, up to 50,000 of whom the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has estimated are without shelter and other basic necessities,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, and underlining the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for creating the conditions which allow them to do so,

Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals by any group or individual, and all external support for such activities in Kosovo, including the supply of arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo and expressing

concern at the reports of continuing violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998),

Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout Kosovo, alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastrophe as described in the report of the Secretary-General, and emphasizing the need to prevent this from happening,

Deeply concerned also by reports of increasing violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law, and emphasizing the need to ensure that the rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo are respected,

Reaffirming the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998), in which the Council expressed support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an enhanced status for Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration,

Reaffirming also the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

Affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which would enhance the prospects for a meaningful dialogue between the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership and reduce the risks of a humanitarian catastrophe;
2. Demands also that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe;
3. Calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with international involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading to an end of the crisis and to a negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo, and welcomes the current efforts aimed at facilitating such a dialogue;
4. Demands further that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in addition to the measures called for under resolution 1160 (1998), implement immediately the following concrete measures towards achieving a political solution to the situation in Kosovo as contained in the Contact Group statement of 12 June 1998:



- a. cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression;
  - b. enable effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo by the European Community Monitoring Mission and diplomatic missions accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including access and complete freedom of movement of such monitors to, from and within Kosovo unimpeded by government authorities, and expeditious issuance of appropriate travel documents to international personnel contributing to the monitoring;
  - c. facilitate, in agreement with the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and allow free and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to Kosovo;
  - d. make rapid progress to a clear timetable, in the dialogue referred to in paragraph 3 with the Kosovo Albanian community called for in resolution 1160 (1998), with the aim of agreeing confidence-building measures and finding a political solution to the problems of Kosovo;
5. Notes, in this connection, the commitments of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in his joint statement with the President of the Russian Federation of 16 June 1998:
- a. to resolve existing problems by political means on the basis of equality for all citizens and ethnic communities in Kosovo;
  - b. not to carry out any repressive actions against the peaceful population;
  - c. to provide full freedom of movement for and ensure that there will be no restrictions on representatives of foreign States and international institutions accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia monitoring the situation in Kosovo;
  - d. to ensure full and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations, the ICRC and the UNHCR, and delivery of humanitarian supplies;
  - e. to facilitate the unimpeded return of refugees and displaced persons under programmes agreed with the UNHCR and the ICRC, providing State aid for the reconstruction of destroyed homes,

and calls for the full implementation of these commitments;

- 6. Insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn all terrorist action, and emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community should pursue their goals by peaceful means only;
- 7. Recalls the obligations of all States to implement fully the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998);

8. Endorses the steps taken to establish effective international monitoring of the situation in Kosovo, and in this connection welcomes the establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission;
9. Urges States and international organizations represented in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to make available personnel to fulfil the responsibility of carrying out effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo until the objectives of this resolution and those of resolution 1160 (1998) are achieved;
10. Reminds the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that it has the primary responsibility for the security of all diplomatic personnel accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the safety and security of all international and non-governmental humanitarian personnel in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and all others concerned in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take all appropriate steps to ensure that monitoring personnel performing functions under this resolution are not subject to the threat or use of force or interference of any kind;
11. Requests States to pursue all means consistent with their domestic legislation and relevant international law to prevent funds collected on their territory being used to contravene resolution 1160 (1998);
12. Calls upon Member States and others concerned to provide adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the region and to respond promptly and generously to the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the Kosovo Crisis;
13. Calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the leaders of the Kosovo Albanian community and all others concerned to cooperate fully with the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the investigation of possible violations within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal;
14. Underlines also the need for the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to bring to justice those members of the security forces who have been involved in the mistreatment of civilians and the deliberate destruction of property;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide regular reports to the Council as necessary on his assessment of compliance with this resolution by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community, including through his regular reports on compliance with resolution 1160 (1998);
16. Decides, should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region;
17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

## **APPENDIX C. MILITARY TECHNICAL AGREEMENT**

### **Between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia**

#### **Article I: General Obligations**

1. The Parties to this Agreement reaffirm the document presented by President Ahtisaari to President Milosevic and approved by the Serb Parliament and the Federal Government on June 3, 1999, to include deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of effective international civil and security presences. The Parties further note that the UN Security Council is prepared to adopt a resolution, which has been introduced, regarding these presences.
2. The State Governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force ("KFOR") will deploy following the adoption of the UNSCR referred to in paragraph 1 and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission. They further agree to comply with all of the obligations of this Agreement and to facilitate the deployment and operation of this force.
3. For purposes of the agreement, the following expressions shall have the meanings as described below:
  - a. "The Parties" are those signatories to the Agreement.
  - b. "Authorities" means the appropriate responsible individual, agency, or organisation of the Parties.
  - c. "FRY Forces" includes all of the FRY and Republic of Serbia personnel and organisations with a military capability. This includes regular army and naval forces, armed civilian groups, associated paramilitary groups, air forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, military police, intelligence services, federal and Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs local, special, riot and anti-terrorist police, and any other groups or individuals so designated by the international security force ("KFOR") commander.
  - d. The Air Safety Zone (ASZ) is defined as a 25-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. It includes the airspace above that 25-kilometre zone.
  - e. The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) is defined as a 5-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. It includes the terrain within that 5-kilometre zone.
  - f. Entry into Force Day (EIF Day) is defined as the day this Agreement is signed.
4. The purposes of these obligations are as follows:

- a. To establish a durable cessation of hostilities, under no circumstances shall any Forces of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia enter into, reenter, or remain within the territory of Kosovo or the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) and the Air Safety Zone (ASZ) described in paragraph 3. Article I without the prior express consent of the international security force ("KFOR") commander. Local police will be allowed to remain in the GSZ.  
The above paragraph is without prejudice to the agreed return of FRY and Serbian personnel which will be the subject of a subsequent separate agreement as provided for in paragraph 6 of the document mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article.
- b. To provide for the support and authorization of the international security force ("KFOR") and in particular to authorize the international security force ("KFOR") to take such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this Agreement and protection of the international security force ("KFOR"), and to contribute to a secure environment for the international civil implementation presence, and other international organisations, agencies, and non-governmental organisations (details in Appendix B).

## **Article II: Cessation of Hostilities**

1. The FRY Forces shall immediately, upon entry into force (EIF) of this Agreement, refrain from committing any hostile or provocative acts of any type against any person in Kosovo and will order armed forces to cease all such activities. They shall not encourage, organise or support hostile or provocative demonstrations.
2. Phased Withdrawal of FRY Forces (ground): The FRY agrees to a phased withdrawal of all FRY Forces from Kosovo to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo. FRY Forces will mark and clear minefields, booby traps and obstacles. As they withdraw, FRY Forces will clear all lines of communication by removing all mines, demolitions, booby traps, obstacles and charges. They will also mark all sides of all minefields. International security forces' ("KFOR") entry and deployment into Kosovo will be synchronized. The phased withdrawal of FRY Forces from Kosovo will be in accordance with the sequence outlined below:
  - a. By EIF + 1 day, FRY Forces located in Zone 3 will have vacated, via designated routes, that Zone to demonstrate compliance (depicted on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement). Once it is verified that FRY forces have complied with this subparagraph and with paragraph 1 of this Article, NATO air strikes will be suspended. The suspension will continue provided that the obligations of this agreement are fully complied with, and provided that the UNSC adopts a resolution concerning the deployment of the international security force ("KFOR") so rapidly that a security gap can be avoided.
  - b. By EIF + 6 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 1 (depicted on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement). Establish liaison teams with the KFOR commander in Pristina.

- c. By EIF + 9 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 2 (depicted on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement).
  - d. By EIF + 11 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 3 (depicted on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement).
  - e. By EIF +11 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have completed their withdrawal from Kosovo (depicted on map at Appendix A to the Agreement) to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo, and not within the 5 km GSZ. At the end of the sequence (EIF + 11), the senior FRY Forces commanders responsible for the withdrawing forces shall confirm in writing to the international security force ("KFOR") commander that the FRY Forces have complied and completed the phased withdrawal. The international security force ("KFOR") commander may approve specific requests for exceptions to the phased withdrawal. The bombing campaign will terminate on complete withdrawal of FRY Forces as provided under Article II. The international security force ("KFOR") shall retain, as necessary, authority to enforce compliance with this Agreement.
  - f. The authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia will co-operate fully with international security force ("KFOR") in its verification of the withdrawal of forces from Kosovo and beyond the ASZ/GSZ.
  - g. FRY armed forces withdrawing in accordance with Appendix A, i.e. in designated assembly areas or withdrawing on designated routes, will not be subject to air attack.
  - h. The international security force ("KFOR") will provide appropriate control of the borders of FRY in Kosovo with Albania and FYROM (1) until the arrival of the civilian mission of the UN.
3. Phased Withdrawal of Yugoslavia Air and Air Defence Forces (YAADF)
- a. At EIF + 1 day, no FRY aircraft, fixed wing and rotary, will fly in Kosovo airspace or over the ASZ without prior approval by the international security force ("KFOR") commander. All air defence systems, radar, surface-to-air missile and aircraft of the Parties will refrain from acquisition, target tracking or otherwise illuminating international security ("KFOR") air platforms operating in the Kosovo airspace or over the ASZ.
  - b. By EIF + 3 days, all aircraft, radars, surface-to-air missiles (including man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS)) and anti-aircraft artillery in Kosovo will withdraw to other locations in Serbia outside the 25 kilometre ASZ.
  - c. The international security force ("KFOR") commander will control and coordinate use of airspace over Kosovo and the ASZ commencing at EIF. Violation of any of the provisions above, including the international security force ("KFOR") commander's rules and procedures governing the airspace over Kosovo, as well as unauthorised flight or activation of FRY Integrated Air Defence (IADS) within the ASZ, are subject to military action by the international security force ("KFOR"), including the use of necessary force. The international security force ("KFOR") commander may delegate control of normal civilian air activities to appropriate FRY institutions to monitor operations, deconflict international security force

("KFOR") air traffic movements, and ensure smooth and safe operations of the air traffic system. It is envisioned that control of civil air traffic will be returned to civilian authorities as soon as practicable.

### **Article III: Notifications**

1. This agreement and written orders requiring compliance will be immediately communicated to all FRY forces.
2. By EIF +2 days, the State governmental authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia shall furnish the following specific information regarding the status of all FRY Forces:
  - a. Detailed records, positions and descriptions of all mines, unexploded ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, obstacles, booby traps, wire entanglement, physical or military hazards to the safe movement of any personnel in Kosovo laid by FRY Forces.
  - b. Any further information of a military or security nature about FRY Forces in the territory of Kosovo and the GSZ and ASZ requested by the international security force ("KFOR") commander.

### **Article IV: Establishment of a Joint Implementation Commission (JIC)**

A JIC shall be established with the deployment of the international security force ("KFOR") to Kosovo as directed by the international security force ("KFOR") commander.

### **Article V: Final Authority to Interpret**

The international security force ("KFOR") commander is the final authority regarding interpretation of this Agreement and the security aspects of the peace settlement it supports. His determinations are binding on all Parties and persons.

6.

### **Article VI: Entry Into Force**

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

### **Appendices:**

#### **A. Phased withdrawal of FRY Forces from Kosovo**



#### **B. International security force ("KFOR") operations**

1. Consistent with the general obligations of the Military Technical Agreement, the State Governmental authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force ("KFOR") will deploy and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo.
2. The international security force ("KFOR") commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission, to do all that he judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the international security force ("KFOR"), the international civil implementation presence, and to carry out the responsibilities inherent in this Military Technical Agreement and the Peace Settlement which it supports.
3. The international security force ("KFOR") nor any of its personnel or staff shall be liable for any damages to public or private property that they may cause in the course of duties related to the implementation of this Agreement. The parties will agree a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as soon as possible.
4. The international security force ("KFOR") shall have the right:
  - a. To monitor and ensure compliance with this Agreement and to respond promptly to any violations and restore compliance, using military force if required.

This includes necessary actions to:

1. Enforce withdrawals of FRY forces.
    2. Enforce compliance following the return of selected FRY personnel to Kosovo
    3. Provide assistance to other international entities involved in the implementation or otherwise authorized by the UNSC.
  - b. To establish liaison arrangements with local Kosovo authorities, and with FRY/Serbian civil and military authorities.
  - c. To observe, monitor and inspect any and all facilities or activities in Kosovo that the international security force ("KFOR") commander believes has or may have military or police capability, or may be associated with the employment of military or police capabilities, or are otherwise relevant to compliance with this Agreement.
5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, the Parties understand and agree that the international security force ("KFOR") commander has the right and is authorized to compel the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific Forces and weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities whenever the international security force ("KFOR") commander determines a potential threat to either the international security force ("KFOR") or its mission, or to another Party. Forces failing to redeploy, withdraw, relocate, or to cease threatening or potentially threatening activities following such a demand by the international security force ("KFOR") shall be subject to military action by the international security force ("KFOR"), including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance.

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## **APPENDIX D. RESOLUTION 1244 (1999)**

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999**

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling its resolutions [1160](#) (1998) of 31 March 1998, [1199](#) (1998) of 23 September 1998, [1203](#) (1998) of 24 October 1998 and [1239](#) (1999) of 14 May 1999,

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:
  - a. Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;

- b. Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;
  - c. Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;
  - d. Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;
  - e. Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
  - f. Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;
  - g. Conducting border monitoring duties as required;
  - h. Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations;
- 10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;
- 11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:
  - a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
  - b. Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;
  - c. Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;
  - d. Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;
  - e. Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
  - f. In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;
  - g. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;
  - h. Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

- i. Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;
  - j. Protecting and promoting human rights;
  - k. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;
- 12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;
- 13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;
- 14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;
- 15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;
- 16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;
- 17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;
- 18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;
- 19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;
- 20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;
- 21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

**Annex 1**  
**Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999**

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;
- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.

**Annex 2**

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of

- provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
    - Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence;
    - Marking/clearing minefields;
    - Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
    - Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
  7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.
  8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.
  9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.
  10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below.<sup>(1)</sup> A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

#### *Withdrawal*

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;

#### *Returning personnel*

- Equipment associated with returning personnel;
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
- Timetable for their return;
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.

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